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I. INTRODUCTION
Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)'
was designed to create a "security exception." Pursuant to this exception, a
contracting party can escape its obligations under the Agreement and take any
action that it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests "in time of war or other emergency in international relations."
2
However, the distinction between the protection of an "essential security
interest" and the advancement of a particular policy agenda has remained
substantially, and quite intentionally, blurred. As a result, although article XXI
was not designed to create a "policy" exception, or to create a mechanism by
which one nation could impose its social, political, or economic ideology on
another, in an environment where both global competition and global
interdependence continue to rise, it is conceivable that article XXI will be
invoked for the wrong reasons. 3 More significantly, article XXI will continue
to serve as a generally unspoken basis for the unilateral imposition of
restrictive trade measures for non-economic purposes. These measures, often
imposed without identifiable standards and without any accountability or
effective retaliatory remedy, undermine the cooperative integrative purposes
of the world trade system. These kinds of trade restrictions perpetuate a
power-based approach to international relations that generates an unacceptable
imbalance between the realities of national sovereignty and the spirit of a
more multilateral form of global economic governance.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT]. This agreement was incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994 by way of para. l(a) of Annex IA of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, April 15, 1994 [hereinafter WTO Agreement], THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS INCLUDING THE AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION AS SIGNED ON APRIL 15, 1994 17 (World Trade Organization, 1999) [hereinafter LEGAL
TEXTS].
2. Article XXI of GATT, supra note I, states that:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any contracting party to fumish any information the disclosure of which it
considers contrary to its essential security interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such
traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the
purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under
the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.
A substantially similar provision is contained in article XIV bis of the General Agreement on Trade in
Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IB, LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 1, at 284 [hereinafter
GATS Agreement].
3. Professor John H. Jackson, the leading authority on GATT, has noted that the exceptions
found in article XXI "provide a dangerous loophole to the obligations" contained in the Agreement.
JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 748 (1969). While recognizing that article
XXI has a legitimate role to play, Professor Jackson expressed concern regarding its potential for abuse
and the possibility for the "arbitrary exercise of economic power." Id. at 752. He went on to note that
"[i]n addition to possible abuse for international political reasons, Article XXI may also shelter some
measures that, although ostensibly imposed for security reasons, may actually be protectionist-oriented."
Id. at 752.
4. Renato Ruggiero, Director-General of the World Trade Organization, stated:
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The lack of clarity surrounding article XXI and other security-based
restrictions is quite understandable. The term "security" or "essential security
interest" is, after all, subject to broad interpretation. While one might
recognize the security threat to the United Kingdom during the Falkland
Conflict, 5 it is somewhat more difficult to recognize the threat posed to
Canada and Australia during that crisis 6 or the threat to the security of Sweden
resulting from a decrease in the domestic production of footwear. The
commingling of the concepts of security, foreign policy, and economic
welfare have exacerbated this confusion!
Compounding the inherent absence of specificity is the fact that most
industrialized nations have taken the position that "security interests" are
indeed self-defining. As a result, the decision regarding the validity of an
action allegedly taken for security reasons is left solely to the discretion of the
party taking that action. Motivation becomes irrelevant, justification and
approval unnecessary. Without a mechanism for a review of such actions,
each nation has the sovereign right to define its own national security interests
[I]n a world where economic opportunities and challenges increasingly transcend national
borders we have to look to forms of international cooperation and new approaches to
international governance. when trade has become thirty percent of world GDP-and is projected
to grow to fifty per cent by the year 2020-how else to define the management of sovereignty?.
The need is not to discuss whether globalization is a good thing, but to ask . . . "what
would be the alternative?" It would be a world divided by economic and political nationalism-a
world in which we would go down the road towards power-based relations, increased tension
and violence, as history has taught us.
An Enabling Environment for Development: The Contribution of the Multilateral Trading System, WTO
Focus (World Trade Organization, Geneva, Switzerland), June-July 1997, at 15, available at http:/l
www.wto.orglenglishlres_elfocus_e/focus20_e.pdf.
5. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 7, 1982, GATT Doc. CdM157, at 2-13
(June 22, 1982); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on June 29-30, 1982, GATT Doc. C/M159,
at 13-22 (Aug. 10, 1982); Trade Restrictions Affecting Argentina Applied for Non-economic Reasons,
GATT Doc. L/5317, at 1-3 (Apr. 30, 1982); Trade Restrictions Affecting Argentina Applied for Non-
Economic Reasons, GATT Doc. U5319/Rev.1, at 1 (May 18, 1982); Trade Restrictions Affecting
Argentina Applied for Non-economic Reasons, GATT Doc. L/5336, at 1-3 (June 15, 1982); Council of
Representatives, Report on Work since the Thirty-Seventh Session, GATT Doc. L15414, at 17-26 (Nov.
12, 1982).
6. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on June 29-30, 1982, GATT Doc. CM1159, at
13-22 (Aug. 10, 1982).
7. Sweden-Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear, GATT Doc. L4250, at 1-4 (Nov. 17,
1975).
8. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (codified in scattered
sections of 19 and 26 U.S.C.), for example, specifically links the concept of national security to
domestic production, capacity, and growth in defense-related industries, as well as to levels of foreign
competition, levels of unemployment, losses in governmental revenues, and the general "economic
welfare of the Nation." 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d) (1994). The International Emergency Economic Powers
Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 201, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706
(1994)), grants authority to the U.S. President to deal with "any unusual and extraordinary threat" to the
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States which has as its source outside U.S.
borders. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a). It is interesting to note, however, that the Trade Sanctions Reform and
Export Enhancement Act of 2000, H.R. 5426, 106th Cong. §§ 901-911 (enacted), places new limitations
on the President in regard to the imposition of unilateral "agricultural" and "medical" sanctions. While
not without exceptions, the Act provides that the President may not impose a unilateral "agricultural" or
"medical" sanction against a foreign country without the prior approval of Congress. Id. §§ 903-904. It
also provides that the President shall terminate any such sanction that is in effect as of the date of
enactment. Id. § 903.
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 26: 413
without foreign interference. In effect, it is impossible for a nation to violate
article XXI. 9
Given the ambiguity of the scope of "security interests," invokers of the
security exception conclude that they are always right, and indeed invoking
nations that are economically and politically powerful have been able to
proceed with impunity. However, this has provoked deep concern and
undermined support for the trade regime. Less developed nations have
continued to express fear that article XXI will be used as a guise for both
political coercion and the protection of domestic industries. Because
meaningful retaliation is not an option, these countries believe that economic
restrictions can be used as a means of punishment, as a mechanism for
economic aggression, and as a creative form of colonialism. Such beliefs have
prompted these nations to question the self-defining nature of the security
exception and to argue that article XXI should be interpreted in light of
broader international law.1
0
9. For debates regarding the self-defining nature of article XXI, see GATT Council, Minutes
of Meeting held on Apr. 3, 1990, GATT Doe. C/M/240, at 30-32 (May 4, 1990) (embargo imposed for
political purposes, contrary to objectives of GATT); Unpublished Panel Report on United States-Trade
Measures Affecting Nicaragua, 1986 WL 363154, L/6053, 1.2, 1.3, 4.1, 4.6, 5.2 (U.S. position that
article XXI is self-defining) (Oct. 13, 1986) (unadopted); id., 4.5, 5.2 (position of Nicaragua); GATT
Council, Minutes of Meeting held on Nov. 5, 1986, GATT Doc. CdM204, at 6-18 (Nov. 19, 1986)
(North/South division regarding article XXI); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on July 17-19,
1985, GATT Doc. C/M/191, at 41-6 (Sep. 11, 1985) (position of U.S., E.U., Canada, North/South
division); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 29, 1985, GATT Doc. C/M1SS, at 2-17
(June 28, 1985) (U.S. position, coercion, punishment, political pressure, arbitrary exercise of power);
Council of Representatives, Report on Work since the Thirty-Seventh Session, GATT Doc. L/5414, at
17-26 (Nov. 12, 1982) (embargo as means of economic aggression, colonialism, punishment, political
pressure contrary to self-defining, inherent or natural rights to self-determination).
10. In regard to the position of less-developed countries regarding the self-defining nature of
article XXI, its potential for misuse, and the need for an interpretation, see, for example, GATT Council,
Minutes of Meeting held on Nov. 5, 1986, GATT Doc. C/M/204, at 6-18 (Nov. 19, 1986); GATT
Council, Minutes of Meeting held on July 17-19, 1985, GATT Doc. C/M/191, at 41-6 (Sep. 11, 1985);
GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 29, 1985, GATT Doc. C1M1188, at 2-17 (June 28,
1985); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on Jan. 26, 1983, GATT Doc. C/M/165, at 18-19 (Feb.
14, 1983); and Council of Representatives, Report on Work since the Thirty-Seventh Session, GATT
Doe. L/5414, at 17-26 (Nov. 12, 1982).
Professor Jackson has noted that "a problem inherent in the national-security argument is that of
determining its limits." JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 18 (1989). The language of
article XXI is "so broad, self-judging, and ambiguous that it obviously can be abused.... In general, the
GATT approach to article XXI is to defer almost completely to the judgment of an invoking contracting
party." Id. at 204-05.
For a discussion of various aspects of article XXI, see Decision Concerning Article XXI of the
General Agreement, Nov. 30, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 23 (1983), Ministerial Declaration,
Nov. 29, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 11 (1983), GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT
LAW AND PRACTICE 599-610 (updated 6th ed. 1995) [hereinafter GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX], Michael
Gaugh, GAIT Article Xff and U.S. Export Controls: The Invalidity of Nonessential Non-proliferation
Controls, 8 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 51 (1995), Michael J. Hahn, Vital Interests and the Law of GAYT: An
Analysis of GATT's Security Exception, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 558 (1991), JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND
THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 3, at 748-52, JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra, at 203-06,
David D. Knoll, The Impact of Security Concerns Upon International Economic Law, 11 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & CoM. 567, 581-607 (1984), Edward A. Laing, Equal Access/Non-Discrimination and
Legitimate Discrimination in International Economic Law, 14 WIS. INT'L L.J. 246, 317-18, 333-43
(1996), Antonio F. Perez, WTO and U.N. Law: Institutional Comity in National Security, 23 YALE J.
INT'L L. 301 (1998), and James R. Wilch, Comment, GATT and the Half-Life of Uranium Industry
Protection, 10 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 150, 181-88 (1989). See also Request of the Government of
Czechoslovakia for a Decision Under Article XXIII, GATT Doe. CP. 3lSR.22 (Jun. 8, 1949); Trade
Measures Taken by the European Community Against the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
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The security exception represents an indispensable escape mechanism or
safety valve without which the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
would cease to exist. Nations are unwilling to participate in such agreements
without the assurance that they have retained the right to protect their
sovereignty from external threat. Absent the ability to weigh the benefits of an
open trade regime and the risks to national security, the requisite flexibility of
the agreement would be lost.'1 Additionally, most industrialized nations have
adopted the view that because the General Agreement is a "trade"
agreement (and the World Trade Organization is a "trade" organization),
matters concerning national security, foreign policy, and other political
disputes should not be placed within its reach. To allow a trade organization to
intervene in these forms of controversies, or to allow it to require justification
for the actions of a sovereign, would not only introduce an element of
GATT Doe. L/6948 (Dec. 2, 1991), GATT Council, EEC-Trade Measures Taken for Non-Economic
Reasons, GATT Doc. DS27/2 (Feb. 10, 1992); supra notes 5, 7, and 9.
For a discussion of economic sanctions in general, see Raj Bhala, Mrs. WATU and International
Trade Sanctions, 33 INT'L LAW. 1 (1999), Clinton E. Cameron, Developing a Standard for Politically
Related State Economic Action, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 218 (1991), Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm
hIternalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2001), Craig R. Giesze, Helms-
Burton in Light of the Common Law and Civil Law Legal Traditions: Is Legal Analysis Alone Sufficient
to Settle Controversies Arising Under International Law on the Eve of the Second Summit of the
Americas, 32 INT'L LAW. 51 (1998), Daniel C. Harms, Note, The Legality of the United States Trade
Embargo Against Nicaragua: The Unfettered Exercise of Presidential Emergency Power in Peacetime,
12 MARSHALL L. REv. 171 (1986), J. Curtis Henderson, Note, Legality of Economic Sanctions Under
International Law: The Case of Nicaragua, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 167 (1986), Christopher C.
Joyner, Collective Sanctions as Peaceful Coercion: Lessons from the United Nations Experience, 16
AusTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 241 (1995), Panel, The Costs and Benefits of Economic Sanctions: The Bottom
Line, 89 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 337 (1995) [hereinafter Panel, The Costs and Benefits], Panel, The
Gulf War: The Law ofInternational Sanctions, 85 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 169 (1991) [hereinafter
Panel, The Gulf War], Panel, Effects and Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions, 84 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 203 (1990) [hereinafter Panel, Effects and Effectiveness], Wynn H. Segall, Running on Empty:
US. Economic Sanctions and Export Controls in 1997, 32 INT'L LAW. 271 (1998), Wynn H. Segall,
Export Controls and Economic Sanctions, 31 INT'L LAW. 393 (1997), and THOMAS V. VAKERICS ET AL.,
ANTIDUMPING, COUNTERVAILING DUTY, AND OTHER TRADE ACnONS 19-20, 553-73 (1987).
11. See Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement, Nov. 30, 1982, GATT
B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 23 (1983) ("[T]hc exceptions envisaged in Article XXI . . . constitute an
important element for safeguarding the right of contracting parties when they consider that reasons of
security are involved."); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 7, 1982, GATT Doe.
C/M/157, at 2, 8 (June 22, 1982) ("[N]o country could participate in GATT if in doing so it gave up the
possibility of using any measures ... to protect its security interests."); GATT Council, Minutes of
Meeting held on Nov. 5, 1986, GATT Doe. C/M/204, at 6, 9 (Nov. 19, 1986) ("[T]o limit a party's
national security rights or enable GATT to examine any party's national security justification for trade
sanctions ... could severely undermine the value and even threaten the existence of GATT .... ");
JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 3, at 536 ("The escape clauses and
exceptions provide the necessary flexibility without which the General Agreement might never have
been concluded or might never have endured .... "); JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra
note 10, at 203 ("One of the exceptions to liberal-trade policies which has always been recognized by
economic theorists and statesmen is that of national security."); Hahn, supra note 10, at 561-62
(National security escape clauses "bring flexibility to the legal bonds imposed by a treaty and by so
doing encourage sovereigns to submit themselves to the discipline of an international legal regime which
might otherwise appear too burdensome .... [such clauses also] provide the necessary 'breathing space'
for the exercise of State sovereignty."); and Wilch, supra note 10, at 181-82 ("Nations assert the
exception because the welfare loss generated by trade controls protecting industries deemed vital to
national security is outweighed by the incalculable benefit of preservation of the state.").
12. See, e.g., Giesze, supra note 10, at 82 ("[A] WTO or NAFTA panel should be hard-
pressed to substitute its own judgment for that of the U.S. Government and conclude that the United
States, as a sovereign nation, had erroneously defined its national security interests .... ).
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unpredictability but would redefine and politicize the nature of the GATT in a
way that would be unacceptable to many contracting parties.
13
To recognize that article XXI is an indispensable safety valve is not to
admit that essential security interests are absolutely incapable of being defined
or that they must be free from all objective parameters. Nor does such a
recognition address the issue of "who" has the ability to define these interests
or to question their validity. Even if one were to admit that security interests
should be self-defined by the invoking party, such an admission does not
inherently address the question as to whether these interests should be self-
defining.14 Furthermore, the argument that the GATT is limited to trade-
related issues and that the World Trade Organization (WTO) is thereby
precluded from intervening in political disputes is unrealistic. Since power in
one area can be used to achieve results in another, it is impossible to insulate
international economics from international politics. 15 Finally, the need-for-
predictability argument is lacking in merit. Reduced to its basic tenet, it stands
for the proposition that total ambiguity will result in the totally predictable
recognition of the validity of every invocation of the security exception.
The power to impose non-reviewable security-based sanctions is
especially troublesome in light of a general intent, on the part of the
international community, to address global problems on a more multilateral
basis. The WTO Agreement is designed to enhance international trade by




Encouraging free trade, however, is merely a means to a more comprehensive
end. The true spirit of the WTO Agreement lies in its attempt to create
additional global wealth, to raise global standards of living, and to "ensure
13. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 7, 1982, GATT Doe. C/M1157, at 2, 8
(June 22, 1982) ("[T]he GATT had never been the forum for resolution of any disputes whose essence
was security and not trade .... ); id. at 9 ("[T]he interjection of political elements into GATT activities
would not facilitate the carrying out of its entrusted tasks."); id. at 10 ("It should therefore be the main
wish of the Council to avoid political discussions, which could risk the non-political character of the
General Agreement .... "); id. ("GATT had neither the competence nor the responsibility to deal with
the political issue. . . ."); see also GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on Nov. 5, 1986, GATT"
Doc. C/M/204, at 8-10 (Nov. 19, 1986) ("GATT was not a forum for examining or judging national
security disputes."). But see Unpublished Panel Report on United States-Trade Measures Affecting
Nicaragua, 1986 WL 363154, L/6053, 5.16 (Oct. 13, 1986) (unadopted) (embargoes create
uncertainty).
14. For a comprehensive analysis questioning the self-defining and non-reviewable nature of
article XXI (in particular, article XXI(b)(iii)), see Hahn, supra note 10. For example, Hahn notes that "it
is not reconcilable with the law of article XXI(b)(iii) to grant to the party invoking the exception sole
authority to determine its interpretation and scope." Id. at 610 n.208. For another perspective regarding
the issue of whether article XXI is self-judging, see Perez, supra note 10, at 324-51.
15. E.g., GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 7, 1982, GATT Doc. C/M/157, at
2, 9 (June 22, 1982) (mentioning comment of the representative of Czechoslovakia on the "difficulty of
insulating international economics from politics"); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 29,
1985, GATT Doc. C/M188, at 2, 9 (June 28, 1985) (mentioning comment of the representative of
Hungary that "[ildeally, politics and trade should be kept separate, but a total separation was not
realistic"). Professor Jackson has also expressed such sentiments. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE
LAW OF GATT, supra note 3, at 752 ("[Ijnternational economics is so intimately related to politics that it
is impossible to insulate the two from each other." (citation omitted)).
16. WTO Agreement pmbl., LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 1, at 4.
2001] Creating Standards 419
that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them,"
share in the benefits that will result.1
7
Despite this spirit of multilateralism, and despite the explicit recognition
of the special needs of developing countries,' 8 the security exception
continues to find its most common usage in disputes between "north and
south" or "rich and poor" nations. It has often been observed that it is quite
easy for a developed nation to impose economic sanctions on a country
lacking the power to retaliate.19 For this reason, poorer countries must rely on
international institutions to enforce their rights,2 and they are often willing to
forfeit a degree of "sovereignty" for that protection. Since over three-quarters
of WTO members are developing countries or transition economies2' and
approximately one-fifth of the developing world's population still lives on
incomes of less than one dollar a day, 2 it is understandable that
"interpretation" of the security exception is a topic of dispute between blocs of
nations at varying levels of economic development. Unfortunately, the
power disparities between developed and developing countries often lead to
inconsistent application of the security exception; when governments have to
choose between profit and principle, they often opt for the former.24
This absence of standards perpetuated by a minority of nations poses an
increasing threat to the stability of the international trade system. Poorer
nations are concerned by the trend toward using economic sanctions for non-
17. Id.; see also Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Internationalizing Our Views Toward Recoupment and
Market Power: Attacking the Antidumping/Antitrust Dichotomy Through WTO-Consistent Global
Welfare Theory, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 69, 80 ("The true spirit of the WTO Agreement lies in its
attempt to: (I) create additional global wealth; (2) raise global standards of living; (3) encourage the
optimal use of resources; and (4) 'ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed
among them' share in the benefits resulting from the WTO Agreement."). New agreements regarding
trade in services, investment measures, intellectual property, safeguards, and sanitary and phytosanitary
measures as well as important changes in the manner in which Panel Reports will become binding on
contracting parties all reflect an effort to establish a multilateral framework. See, e.g., General
Agreement on Trade in Services, WTO Agreement, Annex I B, LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 1, at 284;
Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 1,
at 16; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Agreement, Annex
IC, LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 1, at 321. Prior to the new Agreement, a dispute resolution panel report
would in effect be adopted by way of a unanimous consensus. In other words, a Report would be
adopted unless any GATT member (including one of the parties to the dispute) objected to its adoption.
Under the new WTO Agreement this process is reversed, and a report will be adopted unless there is a
consensus not to adopt the report. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, art. 16, para. 4, LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 1, at 365.
18. GATT, supra note I, arts. XXXVI, XXXVII, and XXXVIII.
19. E.g., GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 29, 1985, GATT Doc. C/M188, at
2, 3 (June 28, 1985) (referring to comments of the representative of Nicaragua); GATT Council,
Minutes of Meeting held on May 7, 1982, GATT Doc. C/M157, at 2 (June 22, 1982) (referring to
comments of the representative of Argentina).
20. E.g., GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 29, 1985, GATT Doc. C/M188, at
3 (June 28, 1985) (referring to comments of the representative of Nicaragua).
21. WTO, TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, THE VORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 6 (1995).
22. Ruggiero, supra note 4, at 14.
23. See, for example, the contrasting positions of different groups of nations in GATT
Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 29, 1985, GATT Doc. C/M/188, at 2-17 (June 28, 1985) and
GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on July 17-19, 1985, GATT Doc. C/M/191, at 41-6 (Sep. 11,
1985); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 7, 1982, GATT Doc. C/M/157, at 2-13 (June
22, 1982).
24. Eric Schmitt, How to Bypass Sanctions and Do Business, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1998, § 4,
at 4.
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economic purposes.2 5 As formal barriers to trade continue to fall, they fear
that the security rationale will rise in their stead. 6
Additionally, changes in the global political environment have increased
both the incentive and the capacity for some countries to engage in supposedly
security-based economic coercion. The end of the cold war, the fall of
communism, and the transition to market economies present a myriad of new
opportunities and freedoms for citizens around the world. At the same time,
however, the resulting vacuum may allow the most powerful nations to
exercise unfettered strength in advancing particular ideological positions.
While such power can be wielded to obtain a variety of beneficial and
humanitarian ends, it can also be used as a guise for protectionism and as a
mechanism for invading the sovereignty of other nations. As a result,
determining the role of multilateral institutions in a world of extreme
economic diversity and imbalances of power will be an issue of increasing
importance.
This Article highlights the socio-economic consequences flowing from
an uneducated and unfettered use of security-based sanctions. In an attempt to
prevent improper application of article XXI, the Article defines the actual
nature of an essential security interest in terms of a variety of legal, economic
and political factors that fall within or go beyond the current scope of article
XXI or prevailing norms. The Article tests the conceptual boundaries of
legality, sovereignty and self-interest and suggests a number of potential
remedies ranging from voluntary guidelines to the use of review procedures
outside the current WTO framework.
In Part II, this Article provides a brief overview of the nature and
implementation of article XXI and explores the blurring of the line between
security and foreign/domestic policy interests. Part III presents a variety of
standards to be employed when considering the invocation of security-based
sanctions. These standards break down into three groups: (1) those requiring
that countries comply with certain duties, such as the exhaustion of remedies,
the use of least restrictive alternatives, consistency in application, and non-
intervention; (2) those aimed at the nature of the threat and the developmental
stage of the target country; (3) those encouraging nations to quantify their
security interests in light of their objectives and their likelihood of success
while accounting for the effects on economic and political stability, effects on
third (non-target) parties, and potential reactions of those third parties to the
imposition of the sanction. Part IV proposes a variety of mechanisms to
increase multilateral accountability by exploring questions of jurisdiction and
accountability, the willingness to examine security issues, the broadening of
remedies, and the expansion of the concept of waivers.
25. See, e.g., Comments of the Representative of Poland, GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting
held on May 7, 1982, GATT Doc. CfM1157, at 9 (June 22, 1982).
26. Leonard E. Santos, The National Security Exception to Free Trade, 30 FED. B. NEws & J.
293 (1983). For a discussion of recent U.S. economic sanctions, see Segall, Running On Empty, supra
note 10, and Segall, Export Controls, supra note 10.
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II. POWER, DISCRETION, AND ABUSE
A. A Starting Point: Article X=I of the General Agreement
Article XXI states that nothing in the Agreement shall prevent any party
from taking any action "which it considers necessary for the protection of its
essential security interests ... taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations." 27 It also provides that no party shall be prevented
from "taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United
Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security."
28
Such exceptions are viewed as "universal" in nature and thus serve to relieve a
party from virtually all of its substantive obligations under the GATT
Agreement.
29
The inclusion of article XXI within the General Agreement certainly
reflects the fact that all States have the right to protect their sovereignty from
external threat. 30 The concept of sovereignty, however, cannot be viewed one-
dimensionally. The International Court of Justice has recognized that "[e]very
State possesses a fundamental right to choose and implement its own political,
economic and social systems."31 The fundamental principle of sovereignty,
upon which the whole of international law is based, recognizes this freedom
of choice and allows for various foreign policies, conflicting alliances, and
varying cultures and ideologies to coexist.32 As a result, the applicability of
article XXI must be viewed not only in light of "protecting" the sovereignty of
one nation, but also in light of "respecting" that sovereignty.
As its drafting history shows, the scope of the article XXI security
exception was a topic of concern and confusion from the outset. In response to
a question regarding the meaning of "essential security interests," one of the
drafters of the original Draft Charter indicated that "there was a great danger
of having too wide an exception ... that would permit anything under the
sun," but that a provision was necessary to protect "real security interests."
33
In attempting to weigh conflicting interests, the drafter noted that "[w]e
cannot make it too tight, because we cannot prohibit measures which are
needed purely for security reasons. On the other hand, we cannot make it so
broad that, under the guise of security, countries will put on measures which
really have a commercial purpose. ' 34 While such a provision is an attempt to
strike a balance between competing interests, a characteristic quite common to
many forms of statutory authority, it should nevertheless create some form of
binding obligation. Yet, the Chairman of the Commission felt it necessary to
add that "the spirit in which Members of the Organization would interpret
27. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXI(b)(iii). For a complete text of article XXI, see supra note 2.
28. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXI(c).
29. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF GATT, supra note 3, at 537-38.
30. Hahn, supra note 10, at 560.
31. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 131 (June 27).
32. Id. at 133.
33. GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 10, at 600, citfing Verbatim Report of the
Preparatory Committee of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., 33rd
mtg. at 20, 21, Corr. 3 U.N. Doe. E/PCIT/AIPV/33 (1947).
34. Id.
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these provisions was the only guarantee against abuses of this kind."05 Such a
position would seem to transform this provision from a binding (albeit
balanced) obligation to a mere aspirational guideline.
Article XXI was meant to be broader or less restrictive than the other
exceptions found in the agreement. The "General Exceptions" contained in
article XX, for example, allow contracting parties to adopt measures that are
necessary to protect public morals or human, animal, or plant life. They also
allow for the adoption of measures that relate to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources or that are essential to the acquisition or
distribution of products in short supply.36 These exceptions, however, are all
qualified by a restrictive introductory paragraph that prohibits the use of such
measures in any manner that would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination or that would constitute a disguised restriction on international
trade.37 It is interesting to note that this paragraph was originally supposed to
apply to the security exception as well since the provisions of both articles XX
and XXI "were lumped together in one article." 38 The two were later
separated during the Geneva drafting sessions, thereby rendering this
qualifying paragraph inapplicable to the security exception.
39
Additionally, in setting parameters for the use of these exceptions,
article XX often employs the term "necessary 40 rather than the language
contained in article XXI allowing a nation to take actions that "it considers
necessary." 41 While it could be argued that the latter envisions a subjective
decision-making process on the part of the invoker, the former would seem to
imply that a more objective, measurable, and reviewable standard should be
applied.
The distinction between "necessary" and "it considers necessary" has
previously been discussed by the ICJ. In Military and Paramilitary Activities
In and Against Nicaragua,42 the ICJ had the opportunity to compare the
language found in article XXI of the General Agreement with the language
contained in article XXI of the 1956 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation between the United States and Nicaragua.43 Under the treaty, a
State could take measures "necessary to fulfill the obligations of a Party for
the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or
necessary to protect its essential security interests." The Court was quick to
recognize the "necessary" and "it considers necessary" distinction, and held
that the issue of "whether a measure is necessary to protect the essential
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(a),(b),(g),j).
37. The introductory paragraph of article XX states that these general exceptions can only be
invoked "[s]ubject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade ...."
38. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 3, at 741.
39. Id. at 742; Hahn, supra note 10, at 566-67.
40. GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(a),(b),(d),(i).
41. Id., art. XXI (b).
42. 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
43. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, U.S.-Nicar., art. 21, 9
U.S.T. 465-66.
44. Id. at 465.
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security interests of a party is not.. . purely a question for the subjective
judgment of the party; the text [of the Treaty] does not refer to what the party
'considers necessary' for that purpose." 45 As a result, the Court found that it
did indeed have jurisdiction to determine whether the measures taken by the
United States fell within the purview of the security exception, whether the
risks run by these security interests were "reasonable," and whether the
measures designed to protect those interests were "not merely useful but
'necessary.' ', 46 After applying such an analysis, the Court determined that the
mining of Nicaraguan ports, the attack on oil installations, and the embargo by
the United States could not be "justified., 47 Similarly in the Case Concerning
Oil Platforms,48 the ICJ had occasion to comment on an identical provision
found in a treaty between the United States and Iran.49 The Court noted that
such a provision "could be interpreted as excluding certain measures from the
actual scope of the Treaty and.., as excluding the jurisdiction of the Court to
test the lawfulness of such measures. It could also be understood as affording
only a defence on the merits."50 The Court, after citing Nicaragua, adopted
the latter interpretation and indicated that this provision did not restrict its
jurisdiction and was confined to affording the Parties a possible defense on the
merits should the occasion arise.
5 1
Despite the very vocal positions expressed by various nations, the
Contracting Parties never decided whether article XXI is self-defining.52
References to "inherent" rights, "essential" security interests, "emergencies in
international relations" and "war materials"' 53 leave substantial room for
subjectivity, and the issue regarding the need for prior U.N. authorization
before invoking article XXI(c) remains unanswered. The 1982 Decision
Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement 54 did nothing to remove
these ambiguities, and the 1982 Ministerial Declaration,55 while certainly
supportive of the spirit of multilateralism, stopped short of establishing any
real obligations. In paragraph 7(iii) of the Declaration, for example, the
contracting parties undertook to "abstain from taking restrictive trade
measures, for reasons of a non-economic character, not consistent with the
General Agreement."56 Although this paragraph has often been cited by
poorer nations subject to sanctions, it could be argued that if article XXI is
indeed self-defining, any trade measure taken pursuant to that article would
automatically be "consistent" with the General Agreement.
45. 1986 I.C.J. 14, 141 (June 27).
46. Id. at 117.
47. Id. at 141.
48. 1996 I.C.J. 803 (Dec. 12).
49. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, U.S.-Iran, art.
XX(1)(d), 8 U.S.T. 899, 912.
50. 1996 I.C.J. at 811 (emphasis added).
51. Id.
52. See Hahn, supra note 10, at 595.
53. In regard to the subjectivity surrounding the meaning of "war materials," see Request of
the Government of Czechoslovakia for a Decision Under Article XIII, GATT Doc. CP.3/SR22-I/28
(June 8, 1949).
54. Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement, Nov. 30, 1982, GATT
B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 23 (1983).
55. Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 29, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 9 (1983).
56. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
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While article XXI has only rarely been formally invoked,57 its use can
serve to demonstrate the potential scope of the security exception. Sweden
chose to invoke article XXI in order to establish a global import system that
was primarily designed to protect its inefficient footwear industry and to give
the industry time to remedy its difficulties. 58 In citing increased imports and
high domestic production costs, Sweden indicated that the decrease in
domestic production "has become a critical threat to the emergency planning
of Sweden's economic defense," and the maintenance of a minimum
production capacity in vital industries is indispensable "in case of war or other
emergency in international relations."59 While many nations expressed serious
doubts regarding the justification of these measures (and reserved their rights
under the GATT),60 it may be argued that if article XXI is self-defining, such
doubts and reservations would be largely irrelevant.
Article XXI has also been used to support, at least in part, the import and
export restrictions applied by Thailand (without any independent
explanation)61 and the suspension of imports from Argentina by the EU,
Canada, and Australia.62 The European Union has also invoked article XXI to
suspend concessions to Yugoslavia and to remove that nation from its list of
beneficiaries, citing the "political instability" in the region and the "potentially
destabilizing consequences elsewhere." 63 Similarly, the boycott of Portuguese
goods by Ghana was based upon the "potential" danger arising out of a
situation in Angola that posed a "constant threat to the peace of the African
continent."64 It was believed that any action that would bring pressure to bear
on the Portuguese Government, and that might lead to a lessening of this
danger, "was therefore justified in the essential security interests of Ghana."
65
The United States has chosen to formally invoke article XXI on at least
two occasions.66 Its export licensing control system, which discriminated
among different destination countries regarding goods that could be used for
military purposes, was in fact based on the article XXI security exception. 67 In
response to the imposition of this system, the Czechoslovakian government
noted that the U.S. had "interpreted the expression 'war material' so
57. For a discussion regarding the instances in which article XXI has been formally invoked,
see GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 10, at 600-06. See also Hahn, supra note 10, at 569-78;
Knoll, supra note 10, at 590-97; Laing, supra note 10, at 333-39; and Wilch, supra note 10, at 182-85.
58. Sweden-Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear, GATT Doc. L/4250 (Nov. 17, 1975).
59. Id. at 3.
60. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held October 31, 1975, GATT Doc. C/M/109, at 9
(Nov. 10, 1975).
61. Accession of Thailand, July 21, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 33 (1983).
62. Trade Restrictions Affecting Argentina Applied for Non-Economic Reasons, GATT Doc.
L/5319/Rev.1 (May 18, 1982).
63. Trade Measures Taken by the European Community Against the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, GATT Doc. L/6948, at 1 (Dec. 2, 1991).
64. GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 10, at 600 (citing Summary Record of the Twelfth
Session held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, GATT Doc. SR.19/12, at 196 (Dec. 21, 1961)).
65. Id.
66. In addition to the Czechoslovakia and Nicaragua cases, the embargo of Cuba was
certainly based on U.S. security interests. While the United States did not formally raise article XI
before the Contracting Parties, the GA'rT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 10, at 605, indicates that "[t]he
United States invoked Article XXI as justification for its action."
67. Request of the Government of Czechoslovakia for a Decision Under Article XXIII, GATT
Doc. CP.3/SR 22 (June 8, 1949).
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extensively that no one knew what it really covered. 65 In imposing the total
embargo on Nicaragua, President Reagan took the position that the policies
and actions of the Nicaraguan government constituted "an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United
States" and thereby declared "a national emergency to deal with that 
threat." 69
In bolstering its use of the security exception, the U.S. also relied heavily
upon the inherent right of "collective self-defense., 70 As will be discussed
shortly, the United States has invoked the security exception on numerous
other occasions as well, but has found it politically expedient to allow article
XXI to remain an unspoken authority.
In light of the above, one could argue that article XXI encompasses
substantially more than actual threats to a nation's essential security interests.
For example, article XXI could be construed as including "potential" threats
to those interests, as well as actual and potential threats to the security
interests of another nation. It also could be interpreted as covering threats to
regional political stability, to foreign policy, to fundamental ideology, or to a
vital domestic industry.
Yet such a broad interpretation of article XXI is not necessarily justified.
Michael Hahn has written that article XXI was not designed to encompass the
"socio-economic consequences" resulting from the operation of GATT
principles, 71 nor was it designed to provide safeguards for "vital industries" or
to allow for the use of other protectionist measures. 72 Instead, Hahn argues
that article XXI is not an unrestricted or open-ended provision allowing
nations to escape their GATT obligations. He notes that both XXI(a) and
XXI(b) have a common prerequisite (namely that essential security interests
be at stake)73 and that XXI(b) has distinct prerequisites limiting its scope to
three objective factual settings.74 An "emergency in international relations,"
for example, is a term with limited meaning and that meaning would be lost if
a nation could define such an emergency at its own whim. 75 Hahn also
believes that GATT Panels do indeed have the power to review article XXI
actions in substance, though such a review would be conducted pursuant to
the very loose standard prescribed by the article.76 Since article XXI is not
totally self-defining, Hahn suggests that States should be required to
demonstrate that they acted for the protection of their essential security
interests and to supply sufficient facts to exclude improper motivation and
show that the objective prerequisites under XXI(b)(i)-(iii) have been met.77
68. Id. at 4.
69. United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, GATT Doe. L/5803, at 2 (May 9,
1985) (emphasis added).
70. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 22, 27, 71, 102-05,
109, 119-20, 123, 127, 146 (June 27).
71. Hahn, supra note 10, at 580.
72. Id. at 581-82, 597.
73. Id. at 579.
74. Id. at 584. Hahn notes, however, that "once these prerequisites are met, though, Article
XXI(b) does not further restrict the options available to Contracting Parties who choose to apply
economic measures for political purposes." Id.
75. Id. at 589-91, 593.
76. Id. at 592 n.149.
77. Id. at 605, 616. Hahn notes, however, that "because article XXI grants the State broad
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B. The Existence of Power and the Existence of Frustration
1. An Overview
The actual use of the security exception, whether or not formally
exercised under article XXI, has failed to reflect the spirit of good faith
commitment to free trade upon which it is based. Rather than being employed
as a safety mechanism to protect essential security interests, it has been used
primarily as a foreign policy tool by powerful States to influence the social,
political and economic policies of weaker nations. Sanctions tend to be most
effective when (among other variables) the target is much smaller than the
nation imposing the sanction.
78
The security exception is an inherently discriminatory remedy. It is
available only to those nations that have the power to successfully coerce, to
successfully punish, and to successfully intimidate. As a result, there is
substantial truth to the accusation that the use of sanctions for purposes of
"political coercion" represents a "policy of force"-a means of economic
harassment or aggression--designed to penalize nations who choose to follow
policies that are "not agreeable" to their stronger neighbors.79 Such coercion
represents "the very essence of' unlawful intervention,80 and while the
process of intervention may reflect the realities of international policy and an
array of political justifications, it certainly does not reflect the "rules of
existing international law.,
8 1
discretion to act whenever it feels that its essential security interests are at stake, The Contracting Parties
(and for that purpose a panel) can only examine (a) whether the objective prerequisites ... have been
met, (b) whether no other violation of applicable principles had taken place and (c) whether the State
acted for what it was entitled to understand as its essential security interests." Id. at 611-12.
Additionally, the "only and quite limited purpose of a 'review' of economic measures for political ends
under the GATT dispute settlement procedure is (a) whether the dispute is of a 'political' character...
and (b) whether the dispute has reached a certain magnitude or, more specifically, whether a breach of
law was involved. When, and only when, those preconditions are met, GATT's 'jurisdiction to
prescribe' ends. Thus, an analysis under article XXIII has to solve the question of whether there is a
'political dispute' and not how to solve it." Id. at 613-14. In regard to issues surrounding the self-
defining nature of article XXI, see Perez, supra note 10, at 324-51.
78. Panel, The Gulf War, supra note 10, at 172 (remarks by Kimberly Ann Elliott). According
to a study cited by Kimberly Ann Elliott, the invoker's economy, as measured by GNP, was on average
187 times larger than that of the average target.
79. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 19 (June 27)
("coerce and intimidate"); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 22, 1986, GATT Doe.
C/M/198, at 33 (June 12, 1986) ("designed to penalize"; "policy of force"); id. at 34 ("politically
motivated, coercive, discriminatory," used against countries "which followed policies not agreeable to
the United States"); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on January 26, 1983, GATT Doe.
CM165, at 15 (Feb. 14, 1983) ("economic harassment"); Council of Representatives, Report on Work
since the Thirty-Seventh Session, GATT Doc. L15414, at 68 (Nov. 12, 1982) (using dominant position in
international trade to apply "coercive measures"); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 29,
1985, GATT Doe. C/M/188, at 4 (June 28, 1985) ("coercion"); id. at 5 ("punish"); and Council of
Representatives, Report on Work since the Thirty-Seventh Session, GATT Doe. 115414, at 17 (Nov. 12,
1982) ("economic aggression"); Trade Restrictions Affecting Argentina Applied for Non-economic
Reasons, GATT Doc. L15317, at 2 (Apr. 30, 1982) ("economic aggression"); GAT Council, Minutes of
Meeting held on May 7, 1982, GATT Doe. C/M/157, at 9 (June 22, 1982) ("punish").
80. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 108 (June 27).
81. Id. at 109 ("[T]he United States authorities have on some occasions clearly stated their
grounds for intervening in the affairs of a foreign State for reasons connected with, for example, the
domestic policies of that country, its ideology, the level of its armaments, or the direction of its foreign
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Despite the lack of a credible "legal" foundation, the unilateral use of
sanctions has been on the rise.82 These sanctions, often based on the security
rationale, can be more stringent than those imposed by the United Nations
(which must be developed by way of consensus and may be interpreted
differently by the various imposing nations),83 and can cause substantial
collateral damage. In addition to imposing immediate hardship on the people
of the target nation, these sanctions tend to retard the nation's future economic
and social development. 84 Future trade will be lost as traditional customers
seek out more stable sources of supply.85 Advances in such areas as housing,
health care, and education will be interrupted as money-flows and political
stability wane and the infrastructure necessary to attract foreign investment
deteriorates. As is often the case, such effects will not be limited to the target
of the sanction but will be felt collaterally throughout the region.
86
The frustration experienced by weaker nations has been substantial.
While it can be rightfully argued that general international law imposes no
duty on a nation to engage in trade with another, it is equally true that such a
duty can be created by way of a treaty or other international agreement to
which that nation is a party.87 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
barring the applicability of one of its exceptions, imposes precisely such a
duty. Pursuant to the Most-Favored-Nation requirement found in article 1,88
every signatory nation has undertaken a binding obligation to grant equal
access to its markets on a non-discriminatory basis. A refusal to trade (at least
in the form of denying market access to another contracting party) would be
unlawful under the terms of the agreement unless justified by the valid use of
an exception.
The sense of frustration is magnified by the fact that the use of unilateral
sanctions has generally been condemned by the international community.
Paragraph 7(iii) of the 1982 Ministerial Declaration, while somewhat
ambiguous, certainly represents an attempt to harness the use of restrictive
policy. But these were statements of international policy, and not an assertion of rules of existing
international law .... [T]he United States has not claimed that its intervention, which it justified in this
way on the political level, was also justified on the legal level ....").
82. See, e.g., Cameron, supra note 10, at 220, 248-49; Panel, Effects and Effectiveness, supra
note 10, at 203-04 (remarks by Michael P. Malloy); Henderson, supra note 10, at 175-76.
83. Panel, The Costs and Benefits, supra note 10, at 341-44 (remarks by William B.
Hoffinan).
84. Trade Restrictions Affecting Argentina Applied for Non-economic Reasons, GATT Doc.
L/5317, at 1 (Apr. 30, 1982).
85. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on June 29-30, 1982, GATT Doc. C/M159, at
13-22 (Aug. 10, 1982).
86. See Unpublished Panel Report on United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua,
1986 WL 363154, 116053, 4.11 (Oct. 13, 1986) (unadopted). For a discussion of collateral damage,
see Panel, The Costs and Benefits, supra note 10, at 352-60 (remarks by W. Michael Reisman).
87. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 138 (June 27) ("A
State is not bound to continue particular trade relations longer than it sees fit to do so, in the absence of a
treaty commitment or other specific legal obligation; but where there exists such a commitment... such
an abrupt act of termination of commercial intercourse as the general embargo ...will normally
constitute a violation of the obligation not to defeat the object or purpose of the treaty."); see also id. at
253 (Oda, J., dissenting) ("Trade is not a duty of a State under general international law but may only be
a duty imposed by a treaty .. .
88. GATT, supra note 1, art. I, para. 1.
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trade measures for non-economic purposes 89 and the use of unilateral security-
based sanctions designed to accomplish foreign or domestic policy agendas
would arguably fall within its reach. Similarly, despite the fact that the United
Nations Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations specifically provides that
"no State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other
type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it
advantages of any kind,' '90 it seems clear that many security-based sanctions
do attempt to subordinate the sovereign rights of the target by restricting its
freedom to choose its own social, economic, or political policies. While one
could argue that a State does not have a sovereign right to gain access to the
market of another nation,91 it can also be argued that a State does have the
right to demand contractual performance from other parties to such
agreements.
Adding to the frustration experienced by these nations is the fact that
heightened expectations have not been met. Part IV of the General
Agreement, 92 for example, is specifically directed toward the plight of less
developed nations. This part of the agreement recognizes that the expansion of
international trade as a means for achieving economic and social advancement
is particularly urgent for these States. In this vein, it addresses the need to
raise the standard of living in these nations, to expand their export earnings, to
provide them with essential imports, and to ensure that they share in
international growth.9 3 Furthermore, Part IV provides that developed countries
"accord high priority" to reducing trade barriers on products that are of
particular export interest to less developed countries 94 and to taking
appropriate action to provide improved conditions of access to world markets
for those products.
95
From a somewhat broader perspective, these same sentiments are
reflected in the U.N. Charter as well. One of the primary goals of the United
Nations is to create the "conditions of stability and well-being" that are
necessary for securing international peace, including higher standards of
living, increased employment, and economic and social development. 96 In
pursuing these goals, however, power-based relations will be discouraged.
Instead, the United Nations will seek to protect the fundamental principle of
"sovereign equality" among nations97 and to promote the resolution of
international disputes through multilateral means.9
89. Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 29, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 11 (1983).
Paragraph 7(iii) provides that the contracting parties undertake "to abstain from taking restrictive trade
measures, for reasons of a non-economic character, not consistent with the General Agreement."
90. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N.
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, 123, U.N. Doc. A18028 (1970).
91. See Cameron, supra note 10, at 235-36.
92. GATT, supra note 1, arts. XXXVI-XXXVIII.
93. Id., art. XXXVI.
94. Id., art. XXXVII, par. 1.
95. Id., art. XXXVIII, para. 2.
96. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
97. Id., art. 2, para. 1.
98. Id., arts. 33-38.
[Vol. 26: 413
Creating Standards
Despite the pleas by weaker nations to examine the security exception in
light of this broader international law,99 the use of the security exception has
either been judged in light of a very constrictive set of parameters or it has not
been judged at all. A major exception to this observation, however, involved
the U.S. sanctions imposed against the nation of Nicaragua.
The GATT Panel in United States - Trade Measures Affecting
Nicaragua00 decided little of any import. While expressing substantial
frustration regarding its inability to address substantive issues, the Panel chose
to honor its restrictive terms of reference. 10 1 In contrast, the International
Court of Justice did in fact take the opportunity to examine the use of the
security rationale (albeit in the context of a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation (FCN))10 2 in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua.103 While this case involved a variety of military actions
taken by the United States, it also dealt with the economic embargo imposed
on Nicaragua for security purposes. Although the security exception found in
article XXI of the Treaty of FCN was distinguishable from that found in
article XXI of the GATT (regarding the "necessary" vs. "it considers
necessary" language),1°4 the case was extremely significant since the court
clearly expressed its willingness to examine the actual substance of security
interests and the merits of invoking a security exception. In doing so, the court
explored the issue of whether the various actions taken could be justified as
"necessary" for the protection of the essential security interests of the United
States.10 5 After pointing out that what is "necessary" was not a question for
the "subjective judgment" of the invoking party,10 6 the court held that while
the trade embargo did not constitute a breach of the principle of non-
intervention, 107 it did constitute a violation of the terms of the Treaty and was
not necessary for the protection of the essential security interests of the United
States.108 As a result, the court found that the security exception provided no
defense to the U.S. embargo.
99. See, e.g., Unpublished Panel Report on United States-Trade Measures Affecting
Nicaragua, 1986 WL 363154, L/6053, 5.2, 5.15 (Oct. 13, 1986) (unadopted).
100. Id.
101. Having been strictly limited by the terms of reference imposed by the United States, the
Panel was prevented from considering the issue of whether article XXI precluded an examination into
the validity of the invocation of the article or the motivation behind its use. Unpublished Panel Report
on United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, 1986 WL 363154, L/6053, 5.3 (Oct. 13,
1986) (unadopted). The Panel clearly expressed its frustration by posing the question: if article XXI was
self-defining, by what means could the Contracting Parties ensure that it would not be used excessively
or for purposes other than those contained in the provision? Id. 5.17. The Panel also expressed its
concern regarding the fact that ifa panel had the task of examining an article XXI invocation, but lacked
the authority to examine its justification, the right of an aggrieved party to have its complaint
investigated and remedied would be limited. Id.
102. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, U.S.-Nicar., 9 U.S.T.
449.
103. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
104. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
105. 1986 I.C.J. 14, 136, 141-42.
106. Id. at 141.
107. Id. at 126.
108. Id. at 140-42. In regard to the fact that a provision employing the "necessary" language
does not restrict the Court's jurisdiction but rather merely affords the parties a possible defense on the
merits, see Case Concerning Oil Platforms, 1996 I.C.J. 803, 811-12 (Dec. 12).
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It is quite telling that the United States, while filing pleadings regarding
the issue of jurisdiction, refused to plead on the merits or participate in the
proceedings. Despite article 94 of the U.N. Charter, 109 the United States also
chose to ignore absolutely the decision of the International Court of Justice
and continued the embargo for almost four more years.
n10
Such a stance reflects the position of more powerful States that disputes
of this nature, being overwhelmingly political in character, are basically non-
justiciable."i In specific regard to the GATT, such nations as the United
States, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, and the European Union, have
been unified in their belief that political, foreign policy, and national security
issues are beyond the auspices of the agreement and that the GATT has no
power, competence, or experience to resolve such disputes. According to this
view, trade and non-trade issues must be kept separate in order for the GATT
to survive, and political issues must be left to the political arena. To do
otherwise would be to "politicize" an agreement that was designed to be
commercial in nature and would thereby threaten its very existence.'
12
While it is true that the GATT was not designed to resolve foreign
policy or other political disputes, it is impossible to completely delink trade
from politics. First, even the most developed of nations, when adversely
affected by the political policies of another, are in no way reluctant to cry foul.
The United States, despite being "the most dominant user of economic
sanctions, '' 13 was also the most ardent critic of the Arab oil embargo.
114
Similarly, Jacques Santer, President of the European Commission,
characterized the U.S. sanctions 1policy toward Iran, Libya, and Cuba as
"illegal and counterproductive." 11 British Prime Minister Tony Blair noted
"that what the United States called sanctions policy, the Europeans called
109. U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 1 ("Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to
comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.").
110. United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, GATT Doc. L/6661, at 1 (Mar. 23,
1990) (regarding the lifting of the embargo).
111. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 239 (June 27) (Oda,
J., dissenting).
112. Stuart E. Eizenstat, Statement by the Department of Commerce and Office of the United
States Trade Representative Concerning the EU's WTO Challenge to the LIBERTAD Act (February 20,
1997), in U.S. Department of Commerce News, Feb. 20, 1997, at 1-2 ("The WTO is not an appropriate
forum for resolving differences over what is essentially a disagreement over foreign policy .... The
WTO was not created to decide foreign policy and national security issues .... [The Panel] has no
competence to proceed .... bring[ing] noncommercial matters into the WTO .... may well jeopardize
what we and others have worked so hard to achieve."). See also Accession of the United Arab Republic,
Feb. 27, 1970, GATT B.I.S.D. (17th Supp.) at 39-40 (1970); Council of Representatives, Report on
Work since the Thirty-Seventh Session, GATT Doc. U5414, at 20, 21, 24 (Nov. 12, 1982); GATT
Council, Minutes of Meeting held on Nov. 5, 1986, GATT Doc. C/M/204, at 9 (Nov. 19, 1986); GATT
Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 29, 1985, GATT Doc. C/M/188, at 5, 14, 17 (June 28, 1985);
GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on June 29-30, 1982, GATT Doc. C/M/159, at 19-20 (Aug. 10,
1982); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 7, 1982, GATT Doc. C/M/157, at 8, 10 (June
22, 1982); Unpublished Panel Report on United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, 1986 WL
363154, L/6053, 4.6, 4.9, 4.15 (Oct. 13, 1986) (unadopted).
113. Panel, The Gulf War, supra note 10, at 171 (remarks by Kimberly Ann Elliot); Panel, The
Gulf War, supra note 10, at 181 (remarks by Jeremy P. Carver).
114. Cameron, supra note 10, at 244.
115. James Bennet, To Clear Air with Europe, US. Waives Some Sanctions, N.Y. TIMEs, May
19, 1998, at A6.
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interfering with the internal affairs of other nations. ' ' 16 In expressing its
anger, the European Union actually turned to the WTO and requested that a
panel be appointed to examine the validity of U.S. policy toward Cuba.
Second, the foreign policy of a nation (often pursued by means of
security-based sanctions) can sometimes reflect nothing more than the
politically expedient calculations of those running for office. Despite the
obvious ineffectiveness of many sanctions, they are often supported by those
in office or by those seeking office in an attempt to take a moral high ground
regarding unacceptable foreign conduct.' 17 Such a stance may be vehemently
adopted despite the fact that a different policy approach might be more
successful in actually achieving the desired results. Some current and former
Pentagon officials, for example, have accused politicians of misrepresenting
the security threat posed by Cuba,118 and at least one commentator has
suggested that the adoption of the Helms-Burton Act 119 was a reflection of the
need for President Clinton to carry Florida and New Jersey in the 1996
election. 1
20
Third, to admit the fact that the WTO lacks jurisdiction to decide
political disputes does not necessarily mean that States have the right to
employ security-based sanctions for political purposes. The GATT requires
Most-Favored-Nation treatment for all signatories, subject only to the
exceptions contained therein and to international agreements such as the 1982
Ministerial Declaration and the United Nations Declaration Concerning
Friendly Relations, which attempt to limit, if not condemn, restrictions for
non-economic purposes. The problem here is that while the employment of
sanctions for political purposes is deplored, the WTO lacks jurisdiction to
address or remedy their use and no other institution or process appears to
possess the authority to review the decision of signatories to invoke the
security exception.
It could also be argued that what actually constitutes a "political" matter
is subject to debate, and that therefore the WTO should have the right to
determine when a dispute is of a political nature and thus beyond its
jurisdiction. 121 Additionally, since politically-based sanctions (often based
upon the security rationale) will have economic or commercial consequences,
it may be queried as to whether the WTO should have the right to determine
whether the sanctions were politically or commercially motivated and, if
politically motivated, whether the WTO should have the ability to address the
economic ramifications flowing from those sanctions. 122 One might also ask
whether the WTO should have the right to determine whether a trade measure,
116. Id.
117. Panel, The Gulf War, supra note 10, at 186 (remarks by Newcomb) (describing sanctions
as a "device to appear to their constituents . .. to be doing something about an outrageous foreign
situation").
118. Christopher Marquis, Pentagon Report Softens Stance on Cuba, THE HARTFORD.
COURANT, Mar. 29, 1998, at Al.
119. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (Helms-Burton Act), Pub. L.
No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6021 (1997)).
120. Segall, Export Controls, supra note 10, at 394-95.
121. Hahn, supra note 10, at 613-14.
122. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 7, 1982, GATT Doe. C1M/157, at 12-13
(June 22, 1982).
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allegedly imposed pursuant to the security rationale, would be better classified
under article XIX or XX (with the accompanying procedures and safeguards),
or whether the measure (and the dispute upon which it is based) should be
referred to the U.N. Security Council.
Finally, the argument that political disputes lie beyond the jurisdiction of
the WTO is inherently linked to the position that essential security interests
are indeed self-defining. Such a position would seem to be supported by the
"it considers necessary" language found in article XXI, which implies a
substantial degree of subjectivity on the part of the nation invoking the
exception, as well as by the lack of any qualifying paragraph such as that
contained in article XX. As a result, it has often been stated that every nation
"must have the last resort," 12 3 or must be the "sole judge" regarding issues
involving its national security interests. 24 On the other hand, there are nations
which believe that article XXI can be invoked only when the specific
conditions provided for in the article have been met and when there is a bona
fide "nexus" between the alleged security interest and the trade restriction
being imposed.12 5 If it were otherwise, the term "essential" security interests
would become meaningless, as would the language "relating" to fissionable
materials, "relating" to the traffic in arms, and "taken in time of war or other
emergency in international relations."' 26 If article XXI was meant to be
unbridled, the drafters could have simply limited the language to "nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any contracting party from
taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its security
interests." Since the drafters chose not to do so, some deference must be
accorded to their decision.
2. The Blurring of National Security and Foreign Policy
Barring a breach of international law, all States have the sovereign right
to develop and implement their own foreign policy free from multilateral
interference. However, those nations that have willingly become signatories to
the WTO Agreement (or its GATT predecessor) have in fact given up a
degree of that sovereignty. In exchange for receiving the benefits envisioned
123. Request of the Government of Czechoslovakia for a Decision Under Article XXIII, GATT
Doe. CP.3/SR.22 at 7 (June 8, 1949).
124. Summary Record of the Twelfth Session held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, GATT
Doc. SR.19/12, at 196 (Dec. 21, 1961), quoted in GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 10, at 600. See
also, e.g., GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on Nov. 5, 1986, GATT Doc. C/M/204, at 6-18
(Nov. 19, 1986); Unpublished Panel Report on United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua,
1986 WL 363154, L/6053, 4.1, 4.6, 5.2 (Oct. 13, 1986) (unadopted); GATT Council, Minutes of
Meeting held on July 17-19, 1985, GATT Doc. C/M/191, at 41-6 (Sep. 11, 1985); GATT Council,
Minutes of Meeting held on May 29, 1985, GATT Doc. C/M/188, at 2-17 (June 28, 1985); Council of
Representatives, Report on Work since the Thirty-Seventh Session, GATT Doc. L/5414, at 19-26 (Nov.
12, 1982); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on June 29-30, 1982, GATT Doc. C/M/159, at 13-
21 (Aug. 10, 1982); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 7, 1982, GATT Doe. CIM157, at
8-13 (June 22, 1982); Trade Restrictions Affecting Argentina Applied for Non-Economic Reasons,
GATT Doe. L/5319/Rev.1, at 1 (May 18, 1982).
125. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on Nov. 5, 1986, GATT Doe. C/M/204, at 14
(Nov. 19, 1986); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 29, 1985, GATT Doc. C/M/188, at 5,
8, 13 (June 28, 1985).
126. For a discussion regarding the fact that article XXI is not unlimited in its scope, see
comments by Hahn, supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text and Perez, supra note 10, at 324-51.
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by the agreement, each member has obligated itself to be bound by its terms,
including the mandate to extend MFN status to all other members. While the
agreement does indeed provide some exceptions, including one for the
protection of essential security interests, it does not provide an exception for
the achievement of foreign policy goals or for the advancement of a particular
ideology. In the absence of such an exception, the foreign policy of a
signatory nation must in fact be developed within the confines of such a
binding agreement and must be consistent with its basic tenets. Unfortunately,
nations have often blurred the distinction between foreign policy and security
concerns in order to advance policy agendas under the guise of the WTO
exception. While such a strategy is not unique to the United States, a brief
examination of the U.S. approach serves to highlight the "convenience" of
merging these issues.
The Helms-Burton Act, t27 for example, is allegedly based upon existing
threats to U.S. security posed by Cuba and the Castro regime. 128 While one
could argue that there are some security concerns upon which the Act is
based, 129 it is not clear that the creation of a civil cause of action against
European and Canadian defendants' 30-- or the exclusion from the United
States of corporate spouses and children-is really necessary to protect U.S.
security. 131 In light of the fact that many experts believe that Cuba no longer
poses a realistic security threat, 132 the Act basically represents a foreign policy
"wish list" and establishes a punishment/reward system for accomplishing its
goals. It envisions a democratic form of government in Cuba, 133 free and fair
elections, an independent judiciary and trade unions, free speech, the holding
of private property, the movement toward a market-oriented economy and the
unfettered operation of small businesses. 134 Additionally, by viewing the
operation of an unsafe nuclear power plant as "an act of aggression,"' 3 the
127. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (Helms-Burton Act), Pub. L.
No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6021 (1997)). For a discussion of the Helms-
Burton Act, see Cleveland, supra note 10, at 58-61, 62-65; Giesze, supra note 10, at 51-92; Segall,
Export Controls, supra note 10, at 394-96; John F. Murphy, Foreign Claims, 31 INT'L LAW. 579, 579-81
(1997); Ricardo J. Cata, Inter-American Law, 31 INT'L LAW. 527, 528-30 (1997). See also Trade
Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, H.R. 5426, 106th Cong. §§ 903-04 (enacted)
(easing of unilateral agricultural and medical sanctions).
128. 22 U.S.C. § 6021(28) ("For the past 36 years, the Cuban government has posed and
continues to pose a national security threat to the United States.").
129. For example, the Helms-Burton Act is designed to discourage foreign investment that
could be used to support a totalitarian government ninety miles from U.S. shores. The shooting down of
two Brothers To the Rescue planes could be viewed as an act of terrorism and as a violation of
international law. Id., § 6046(a). In fact, the mere act of training and supplying groups dedicated to
international violence is also a violation of international law. Id., § 6021(14).
130. George Kleinfeld & Deborah Wengel, Foreign Investment, 31 INT'L LAW. 403, at 404
(1997) (observing that the United States "has yet to explain how lawsuits to recover damages from
foreign defendants over disputed property confiscated by Cuba over thirty years ago would enhance
America's national security in 1997 and the years ahead.").
131. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (Helms-Burton Act) § 401(a),
22 U.S.C. § 6091(a) (1997).
132. Marquis, supra note 118, at Al.
133. 22 U.S.C. § 6064. See also id., §§ 6022(1), 6022(4), 6022(5), 6033(b)(1), 6034(a)(2),
6039(a), 6062, 6063. But see Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, H.R. 5426,
106th Cong. §§ 903-04 (enacted) (easing of unilateral agricultural and medical sanctions).
134. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6042(1)(A), 6065(a), 6065(b), 6066(3).
135. Id. § 6031(4); see also id. § 6041(a)(1).
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Act provides a rationale for applying the security exception against nations
reducing the world's rainforest acreage or contributing to the pollution of the
atmosphere.
Similarly, a variety of other U.S. statutes136 reflect the failure to
differentiate between those restrictions necessary to protect national security
and those employed for foreign and domestic policy purposes. The breadth of
criteria to be applied in determining the existence of a threat to security is
boundless and often indefensible. They include a variety of "vital industry"
concerns (such as domestic production levels, domestic capacity, and the
potential for maintaining necessary growth) and equate national security
interests with general economic welfare and the potential weakening of the
domestic economy.
137
Additionally, threats to national security, foreign policy, and the
economy are often lumped together in a tidy statutory package that allows the
true nature of the threat to remain substantially unidentified. 138 The lack of
statutory differentiation and the absence of any requirement to designate the
precise grounds upon which an action is based can lead to a variety of
politically-related sanctions loosely based on a potpourri of external threats.
The existence of such broad discretion, 139 of course, provides a substantial
basis for the exercise of power-based diplomacy and may actually encourage
the discriminatory application of trade sanctions against targets too weak to
retaliate and too economically "inconsequential" to muster international
support.
1 40
The fact that some nations have substantially more power than others
does not imply that powerful nations should not vigorously combat threats to
their security, nor does it imply that attempts to address deplorable human
conditions are anything but laudable.141 What is being argued, however, is that
the "security" exception, whether exercised pursuant to article XXI of the
GATT or pursuant to customary international law, should be limited to actual
or potential threats to essential security interests. The total lack of procedural
safeguards and effective forms of relief dictates that the security exception be
excluded as a tool for accomplishing other domestic and foreign policy goals.
136. See, e.g., Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 232, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1994); International
Emergency Economic Powers Act § 201, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Export
Administration Act of 1979 § 1, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
137. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d).
138. International Emergency Economic Powers Act § 201, 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1994 & Supp.
II 1997); Export Administration Act of 1979 § 3(2), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2) (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997).
139. For a broader discussion regarding the discretion bestowed on the President by sanctions
laws, see Cleveland, supra note 10, at 77-82.
140. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2402(2)(B), 2402(7), 2402(10), 2405 (1994 & Supp. m 1997)
(regarding power-based diplomacy); 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401(4), 2405(b)(1)(A), 2405(b)(1)(E),
2405(b)(1)(C) (regarding discriminatory application and the fact that trade restrictions are more likely to
be "enforceable" or capable of "achieving their intended purpose" when directed at a target without
power).
141. For an in-depth discussion regarding the use of unilateral measures to promote human
rights, see Cleveland, supra note 10. In this regard, Cleveland argues that "while some U.S. unilateral
measures are problematic and subject to abuse, those that are consistent with international law and that
promote recognized human rights standards play an important and legitimate part in transnational legal
process and the promulgation and internalization of fundamental human rights." Id. at 7.
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Instead, those goals should be pursued within the construct of the WTO
Agreement and other binding international contracts.
III. THE CREATION OF STANDARDS FOR THE USE OF THE SECURITY EXCEPTION
A. An Introduction: The Spirit of Multilateralism
It is not the purpose of this Article to suggest that some form of
multilateral Utopia is at hand. The realities of power-based relations, the
intentional blurring of national security and foreign policy issues, and the need
to satisfy political constituencies would seem to defy such an argument.
Nevertheless, this Article does suggest that a fundamental basis exists upon
which a more multilateral approach to security-based sanctions can be
developed.
The U.N. Charter, which prevails over all other international
agreements, 142 indicates that the United Nations was created to maintain
international peace and security through "collective measures." 143 It is
designed to achieve "international co-operation" in addressing global
problems' 44 and to act as a center "for harmonizing the actions of nations" in
the attainment of these goals. 145 In carrying out these commitments to
multilateralism, parties to any dispute that is "likely to endanger" international
peace and security are required to seek a solution through such mechanisms as
negotiation, mediation, arbitration or judicial settlement.146 In the event that
the parties fail to arrive at a satisfactory solution, the dispute "shall" be
referred to the Security Council 147 for its recommendations regarding
appropriate procedures and methods of adjustment. 148 Additionally, when an
actual "threat to the peace" may conceivably be involved, the Security
Council has the duty to determine whether such a threat exists and what
measures, including the imposition of sanctions,149 should be taken to
maintain or restore the peace. 50 If sanctions are in fact imposed, all Member
States are bound to implement that Security Council decision.
151
The ability of the United Nations to impose economic sanctions is
potentially quite broad in scope. The criteria listed in article 39-threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, and acts of aggression-defy precise definition
and vest substantial discretion in the Security Council.152 It has been held, for
example, that "massive and systematic violations of human rights may
142. U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
143. Id., art. 1, para. 1.
144. Id.,art. 1, para. 3.
145. Id.,art. 1, para. 4.
146. Id., art. 33.
147. Id., art. 37.
148. Id., art. 36.
149. Id., art. 41.
150. Id., art. 39.
151. Id., art. 48.
152. Article 39 states that "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace
and security." Id., art. 39; see also Panel, The Costs and Benefits, supra note 10, at 345 (remarks by
Shigeo Kawagishi).
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constitute a 'threat to eace' under Article 39" that justify the imposition of
economic sanctions. U Under such a rationale, it could be argued that
deplorable standards of living, massive unemployment, suppression of
political and religious freedoms, and other extreme social, economic, and
cultural disadvantages also pose a "threat to peace" by endangering the
"stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly
relations among nations."154
It may also be posited that security-based sanctions imposed unilaterally,
which are inherently designed to create social and economic hardship, violate
the provisions of the U.N. Charter. Such sanctions may pose a "threat to
peace" by way of jeopardizing the conditions of stability and well-being that
are necessary to maintain that peace. Additionally, article 2 of the Charter
states that Member States shall settle their disputes "by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered,"155 and that Members shall refrain from the threat or use "of
force" in their international relations. 156 Even if it is admitted, as is generally
the case,157 that economic sanctions are "peaceful means" and do not
constitute the use of "force," it might nevertheless be argued that they can
"endanger" international peace and security. Such an argument would
recognize that article 2(3) does not merely require that disputes be settled
"peacefully," but that they be settled in a manner that does not endanger the
peace. Severe and coercive economic sanctions, which tend to impose
substantial collateral damage on both the target state and the surrounding
states in a region and which often pit one nation or ideology against another,
would seem to fail the second prong of this dispute settlement requirement.
In recognizing the spirit of these Charter provisions and the desire to
address global problems on a more multilateral basis, several attempts have
been made to limit the use of unilateral sanctions in general and the discretion
upon which they are based. The United Nations Declaration Concerning
Friendly Relations provides that no State may use economic measures to
coerce another nation in order to obtain a subordination of that nation's
sovereign rights and to secure an advantage of any kind.158 Similarly, in the
1982 Ministerial Declaration, the GATT Contracting Parties agreed "to
abstain from taking restrictive trade measures, for reasons of a non-economic
character, not consistent with the General Agreement."
159
The new WTO Agreement, however, represents the most notable effort
to multilateralize commercial intercourse and to limit the exercise of unilateral
discretion ever undertaken. The original GATT was in fact a set of rules
applied only on a provisional basis with a very limited institutional
foundation. 16 The WTO, in contrast, is a permanent institution, with its own
153. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (Helms-Burton Act) § 2(24),
22 U.S.C. § 6021(24) (1997).
154. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
155. Id., art. 2, para. 3 (emphasis added).
156. Id., art. 2, para. 4.
157. Cameron, supra note 10, at 223-34.
158. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
159. Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 29, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 9, 11 (1983).
160. WTO, TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supra note 21, at 11.
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secretariat, and with a character that is substantially different than that of the
GATT. 161 Under the GATT dispute settlement mechanism, nations were quite
free to act unilaterally regarding the imposition of trade restrictions, since they
had the power to simply block any adverse dispute resolution panel decision
that might result from their actions.162 Under the new WTO framework,
unilateral actions in violation of the Agreement can indeed be subject to relief
since the power to block Panel Reports has been removed.
In attempting to promote international trade and limit the exercise of
potentially abusive discretion, the WTO framework incorporates a variety of
other agreements as well. In regard to the former, new agreements were
established regarding trade in services, investment measures, and the
protection of intellectual property.163 In regard to the latter, the WTO
Agreement contains such provisions as those regulating the application of
sanitary and phytosanitary measures 64 and other technical barriers to trade.
165
These provisions prohibit arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or disguised
restrictions on trade, and they require (when relevant) evidence of scientific
justification. 166 Similarly, the Agreement on Safeguards 167 is designed "to re-
establish multilateral control" 168 by establishing conditions and procedures for
invoking the escape mechanism under article XIX.
In addition to this general spirit of multilateralism, the GATT agreement
arguably places limitations on security-based measures taken outside the
auspices of article XXI. Article XIX, for example, deals with the suspension
of GATT obligations when products are being imported under such
circumstances as to cause or threaten "serious injury to domestic
producers." 169 Such a threat to domestic industry or economic welfare could
clearly be classified as a "national security" issue under some legislation.
170
Similarly, escape provisions under article XX relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources, the ensuring of availability of essential
161. Id.
162. For discussion regarding the adoption of panel reports and the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, see supra note 17. See also Terence P. Stewart,
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act: An Overview of Major Issues and Potential Trouble Spots, in THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S.
IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION, 29, 33 (Terence P. Stewart, ed., 1996).
163. General Agreement on Trade in Services, WTO Agreement, Annex IB, LEGAL TEXTS,
supra note 1, at 284 (Services); Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, WTO Agreement,
Annex IA, LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 1, at 143 (investment measures); Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Agreement, Annex I C, LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 1, at
321 (intellectual property).
164. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, WTO Agreement,
Apr. 15, 1994, Annex IA, LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 1, at 59.
165. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, WTO Agreement, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1 A,
LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 1, at 121.
166. See, e.g., Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, WTO
Agreement, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1 A, art. 2(2), LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 1, at 60.
167. Agreement on Safeguards, WTO Agreement, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex IA, LEGAL TEXTS,
supra note 1, at 275.
168. WTO Agreement pmbl., supra note 16.
169. GATT, supra note 1, art. XIX (1)(a).
170. See, e.g., Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 232(d), 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d) (1994).
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materials to domestic industry, and the acquisition of products in short supply
all have national security overtones.
1 71
Nevertheless, both of these articles place substantial limitations on the
exercise of unilateral discretion. Article XIX, as implemented by the
Agreement on Safeguards, imposes requirements regarding serious injury,
notification, consultation, investigation, surveillance, and duration, and
requires that restrictions be imposed "only to the extent necessary." 172 Article
XX exceptions are all subject to restrictions that prohibit the use of measures
that constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or that constitute
disguised restraints on trade, and some article XX exceptions are further
qualified by a "necessity" requirement. 173 As is obvious from the Panel Report
in United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,174 these conditions must
be satisfied before an exception can be invoked, and a WTO panel will indeed
review an economic restriction to determine whether those conditions have
been met.175 As a result, a nation will not be allowed to impose an embargo
under article XX simply because it wants to force another nation to alter its
internal policies.
176
The above indicates that both the United Nations and the WTO envision
global relationships that are based upon community and international
agreement rather than upon relative economic strength. The unilateral
imposition of security-based sanctions, based upon a self-defining and fluid
security exception, stands in opposition to such a vision. Undertaken without
parameters or accountability, such sanctions undermine the stability of the
international trading system and endanger both the credibility and viability of
the WTO Agreement. 177 As the Panel indicated in United States - Trade
Measures Affecting Nicaragua, economic sanctions imposed for security
reasons create uncertainty in trade relations, reduce the incentives for
governments to engage in open trade practices, reduce the willingness of
businesses to invest overseas, and run counter to the GATT aim of fostering
non-discriminatory trade policies. 178 Rather than enhancing the rule of law
171. GATT, supra note 1, arts. XX (g) (natural resources), XX (i) (essential quantities), and
XX (6) (short supply).
172. Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 167, arts. 2 and 4 (serious injury), art. 3
(investigation), art. 5 (only to the extent necessary), art. 7 (duration), art. 12 (notification and
consultation), art. 13 (surveillance).
173. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
174. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS29/R (June 16, 1994).
175. See also United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT
B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345 (1990).
176. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, supra note 174, 5.38-.39, 5.42.
177. See, e.g., GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on Nov. 5, 1986, GATT Doc.
CM204, at 12, 16 (Nov. 19, 1986) (erosion of GATT rules and need to maintain stability); GATT
Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 29, 1985, GATT Doc. C/M188, at 4 (June 28, 1985)
(undermines multilateral trading system); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on July 17-19, 1985,
GATT Doc. C/M/191, at 5, 15 (Sep. 11, 1985) (undermines credibility); Decision Concerning Article
XXI of the General Agreement, Nov. 30, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 23 (1983) ("element of
disruption and uncertainty for international trade"); Council of Representatives, Report on Work since
the Thirty-Seventh Session, GATT Doc. L/5414, at 18-19 (Nov. 12, 1982); GATT Council, Minutes of
Meeting held on June 29-30, 1982, GATT Doc. C/M/159, at 13 (Aug. 10, 1982); GATT Council,
Minutes of Meeting held on May 7, 1982, GATT Doc. C/M/157, at 3, 6 (June 22, 1982) (undermines
credibility).
178. Unpublished Panel Report on United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, 1986
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upon which a multilateral system must be based, 179 the exercise of discretion
gives rise to a trading system that can be arbitrary, unpredictable, and
unsustainable, 180 and such discretion can serve to deny promised protections
to the world's weaker economic partners.
181
B. The Creation of Standards
The unilateral imposition of security-based sanctions, whether invoked
pursuant to article XXI or customary international law, should reflect a
substantial and quite encompassing decision-making process. In reality,
however, such a decision may merely represent the broad, and often
unchecked, discretion of one individual - an individual who is subject to a
variety of political pressures and who is "guided" by statutory authority that
conveniently confuses national security with politics, foreign policy, and
general economic welfare. To remedy this problem, the following section
presents a series of criteria that should be weighed whenever such a decision
is being made. In this regard, no single criterion is meant to be determinative.
Instead, each criterion should be viewed as one component of a broad,
educated, and honest decision-making process.
1. Respecting the Rights to Sovereignty and Nonintervention
All nations are bound by both treaty and customary international law to
the fundamental principles of sovereignty and nonintervention. 182 These
closely linked doctrines stand for the proposition that every State has the right
to conduct its affairs without outside interference and that all nations must
respect not only the territorial integrity of other States but their political
integrity as well. 183 Thus, nations are prohibited from intervening either
directly or indirectly in the internal or external affairs of another State
regarding matters that a sovereign State is permitted to decide freely for itself,
including the choice and implementation of political, economic, social and
cultural systems; the formation of foreign policy; the adoption of ideology; the
protection of currency and assets; and the creation of alliances and trading
relationships with other nations.
18 4
WL 363154, L16053, 5.16 (Oct. 13, 1986) (unadopted).
179. See, e.g., JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 3, at 752. See also
Comment of the Representative of Czechoslovakia, Council of Representatives, Report on Work since
the Thirty-Seventh Session, GATT Doc. L5414, at 20 (Nov. 12, 1982) (describing GATT's basic
purpose as "to bring law and order into trading relations... "); Comment of the Representative of
Hungary, GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 29, 1985, GATT Doc. C/M/188, at 9 (June
28, 1985) (noting that GATT's key function is "to bring law and order into international economic
relations....').
180. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on July 17-19, 1985, GATT Doc. C/M/191, at
13 (Sep. 11, 1985).
181. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on Nov. 5, 1986, GATT Doc. C/M1204, at 13
(Nov. 19, 1986); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 29, 1985, GATT Doc. C/M/188, at 9
(June 28, 1985).
182. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 98, 106,
131, 133, 144 (June 27).
183. Id. at 106.
184. Id. at 108, 131, 133. For discussions of the doctrines of sovereignty and nonintervention,
see id. at 106-11, 124-33; Cameron, supra note 10, at 234-38, 250; Panel, The Costs and Benefits, supra
2001]
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
There is no clear prohibition against the use of economic sanctions for
political and ideological purposes.' 85 In the Nicaragua case, for example, the
International Court of Justice declined to hold that the U.S. embargo
constituted a form of indirect intervention. 186 While the term "economic
sanction" may include, for example, multilateral sanctions imposed pursuant
to U.N. authorization or sanctions specifically designed to punish, condemn,
or spur racial equality, this Article focuses on the application of unilateral,
security-based sanctions, which inherently lack procedural safeguards and are
apparently free from all international inquiry. These sanctions, imposed
without multilateral support or accountability, are particularly suspect and
must therefore be carefully scrutinized in light of the principles found in both
the WTO Agreement and the U.N. Charter.
It is within such a context that sanctions allegedly imposed for security
purposes are often only tangentially aimed at protecting essential security
interests and are primarily aimed at coercing other nations to alter their
foreign or domestic policies or to change their established trading
relationships. The United States, for example, has admitted that it has
intervened (under the pretext of protecting its essential security interests) in
the affairs of other States for reasons involving "the domestic policies of that
country, its ideology . . . or the direction of its foreign policy." 1 7 It has
imposed security-based sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the ouster of
one regime and the establishment of another; for the purpose of requiring a
transition to a particular political or economic system; for the purpose of
affecting political realignment; and for the purpose of coercing other nations
into supporting U.S. policies.
188
Common sense suggests that the whole purpose of such coercion, while
dressed in terms of protecting essential security interests, is actually designed
to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another nation and to
influence the "choices" being made by that sovereign. Despite the laudable
purposes that may or may not be involved, "[t]he element of coercion ...
forms the very essence of prohibited intervention" when it is employed to
deny other sovereign States their freedom to choose. 189 As was argued in the
Tuna case, 19° the doctrine of sovereignty requires that every State remain
"supreme internally." 191 The use of a security-based sanction can not only
note 10, at 339 (remarks by Lawrence Boisson de Chazoumes) ("[A]ny economic countermeasures,
irrespective of their purpose, have to comply with the customary international law principle of
nonintervention."); Cleveland, supra note 10, at 49-56; and HENDERSON, supra note 10, at 191-96.
185. Panel, The Costs and Benefits, supra note 10, at 339 (remarks by Lawrence Boisson de
Chazournes). See also supra notes 74 and 77 (discussing the broad discretion of states in determining
what constitutes a "security threat" that might serve as a basis for imposition of economic sanctions);
Cleveland, supra note 10, at 6-7 (arguing that sanctions can promote internalization of human rights
norms by the target state).
186. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 126 (June 27) ("[A]t
this point, the Court had merely to say that it is unable to regard such action on the economic plane as is
here complained of as a breach of the customary-law principle of non-intervention.").
187. Id. at 109.
188. Id. at 56; supra notes 127-135 and accompanying text.
189. Id. at 108.




represent an attempt to interfere with this internal supremacy, it also can
represent an attempt to place that interference above review.
The questions of sovereignty and intervention at least arguably present
an inherent conflict. On the one hand, every nation has the sovereign right,
absent voluntarily assumed treaty obligations, to decide and to implement its
own foreign policy. On the other hand, each nation also has the sovereign
right to conduct its affairs free from interference by others.
The fine line between these two rights is a matter of interpretation. The
Helms-Burton Act, for example, is viewed by the United States as a mere
extension of a long established foreign policy dating back to the Kennedy
administration. 192 The Europeans, in contrast, believe that the Act is a perfect
example of interfering with the internal affairs of other nations and is, along
with U.S. policies toward Iran and Libya, both "illegal and
counterproductive." 193 Similarly, Canada and a variety of Latin American
States view Helms-Burton as an extraterritorial application of U.S. law and a
clear invasion of their individual sovereignty.194
This line between potentially conflicting sovereign rights is especially
problematic in the area of secondary boycotts. In such instances, one nation
threatens to punish another nation (or the corporate entities of that nation)
even though the latter poses no direct security threat. These boycotts are
imposed in an attempt to mandate multilateral support for a decision that was
made unilaterally. They are designed "to penalize countries which, in the
exercise of their sovereign rights" want nothing to do with the dispute at
hand. 195 Such measures are simply imposed against any country which
follows "policies not agreeable to" the United States.1
96
One might also question the sovereign right of a nation to subvert the
monetary system of another State or to "assist" in the overthrow of its
government. In regard to the former, the courts have recognized that "[t]he
economic lifeblood of a nation is drawn from its monetary supply, and the
protection of the nation's currency is crucial to its economic survival."'
197
Nevertheless, U.S. statutes for example, are specifically designed to
undermine the monetary systems of unfriendly nations by means of
obstructing the flow of hard currency to those countries. Such a goal is
accomplished not only by means of a refusal to trade, but also by means of
prohibiting other nations or corporations from transferring hard currency (and
other needed resources or expertise) to those targets, and by threatening to
withhold payment to international financial institutions that provide loans or
other assistance to those countries.'
98
192. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, supra note 112.
193. Bennet, supra note 115, at A6.
194. Peter Glossop, Canada s Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act and U.S. Restrictions on
Trade With Cuba, 32 INT'L LAW. 93, 97, 104 (1998); Ricardo J. Cata, Inter-American Law, 31 INT'L
LAW. 527, 529-30 (1997).
195. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 22, 1986, GATT Doe. C/M/ 98, at 33
(June 12, 1986).
196. Id. at 34.
197. U.S. v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1297 (4th Cir. 1995).
198. See, e.g., Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (Helms-Burton Act)
§ 104, 22 U.S.C. § 6034 (1997); Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 §§ 4-6, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp.
IV 1998); Export Administration Act of 1979 §3, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402 (1994); United States-Imports
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It is a fundamental tenet of international law that no nation shall "assist,
foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities
directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or
interfere in civil strife in another State." 199 Certainly these principles are
primarily designed to prohibit the support of contras or other armed
opposition through the provision of financial aid, training, intelligence, the
supply of arms and so forth.2 00 Nevertheless, such terms as "assist," "foment,"
"incite," and "interfere" do tend to leave substantial room for interpretation.
One might question the precise meaning of legislation such as the LIBERTAD
Act which specifically authorizes the President to "furnish assistance and
provide other support" for democratic groups in Cuba and for other
individuals and non-governmental organizations in support of democracy-
building efforts. 20 1 While this Act in no way envisions the providing of
military aid, it does in fact envision fostering or perhaps inciting a new
governmental and economic system.
Issues such as these do not lend themselves to easy resolution. The
distinction between the sovereign rights of one nation and the subordination of
the sovereignty of another is nebulous at best. Nevertheless, three
observations appear to be substantially true. First, security-based economic
sanctions, regardless of whether they fit the legal definition of intervention,
are often designed to coerce another sovereign or to alter its internal or
external choices. Second, rights of sovereignty must always be viewed in the
context of existing international agreements that might limit the exercise of
those rights. Since the nature of economic sanctions is to impose restrictions
on international trade, they must be imposed only within the confines of the
WTO Agreement. Since the U.N. Charter requires each nation to respect its
treaty obligations,202 every State should possess the right to demand faithful
performance of those obligations. Finally, sanctions and intervention are
options available only to the most powerful nations.20 3 Under such
circumstances, a duty to weigh the relative rights of sovereignty and non-
intervention should, at least at the outset, be firmly placed upon the potential
imposer of the sanction, and thus incorporated into its broad decision-making
process.
2. The Need to Consider the Target's Stage ofDevelopment
It has been argued that there is "no distinction in GATT or in
international law between developed and developing countries in matters of
security., 204 Such a position raises serious questions since it views article XXI
of Sugar from Nicaragua, Mar. 13, 1984, GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 67 (1985).
199. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 102 (June 27)
(citation omitted).
200. Id. at 119,124,127.
201. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6039(a), 6039(a)(3) (2000).
202. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
203. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 107 (June 27)
(citation omitted).
204. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on June 29-30, 1982, GATT Doc. CM1159, at
20 (Aug. 10, 1982).
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as merely an island within the broader WTO Agreement, totally devoid of all
context or constructive framework. It is also an argument that assumes the
inevitability of power-based relationships and that perpetuates the struggle
between the North and the South, between the rich and the poor. It ignores the
inability of weaker nations to retaliate or to achieve any sort of equitable relief
under article XXIII, and it ignores the fact that the severity of human misery
imposed is often proportionate to the lack of economic development.
The decision regarding whether to unilaterally impose security-based
economic sanctions must take into consideration the developmental stage of
the potential target. Both the WTO Agreement and its GATT predecessor
have accorded special treatment to less-developed nations in an attempt to
stimulate their growth and to enhance their ability to share in an increasing
pool of global wealth. For decades, it has been clearly established that "the
promotion of the trade of less-developed countries and the provision of
increased access for their products in world markets" are "among the primary
objectives of the Contracting Parties.02 65
The whole purpose of Part IV of the General Agreement206 is to address,
and to alleviate, the specific problems facing less-developed countries. Part IV
recognizes the particular urgency of enhancing the economic and social
development of these nations through the expansion of international trade. It
recognizes the need for raising standards of living in these countries, for
expanding their export earnings, and for ensuring the availability of essential
imports. In order to promote their growth, developed countries are to give
substantial priority to the reduction of trade barriers on products of particular
export interest to poorer nations and to the provision of improved accessibility
to world markets for those products.
207
In reflecting these sentiments, the WTO has invited the contracting
parties to improve generalized-system-of-preferences and most-favored-nation
treatment for products of particular export interest to least-developed
countries and to facilitate the participation of poorer countries in multilateral-
trade-negotiation agreements. 208 Pursuant to the so-called Enabling Clause,
contracting parties have been specifically authorized to accord "differential
and more favourable treatment to developing countries, without according
such treatment to other contracting parties" and to provide further "special
treatment" for those developing nations that are indeed in their earliest stages
of development.20 9
None of these provisions are expressly directed at the use of the security
exception. Nevertheless, they do reflect a fundamental recognition that even
the most sacred of GATT tenets must be tempered to meet the needs of less
fortunate nations. Without question, the WTO is founded upon the basic
205. Statement of the Chairman in presenting for approval the Protocol Introducing Part IV of
the General Agreement, February 8, 1965, quoted in GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 10, at page
1040 (citing 2SS/SR.5).
206. GATT, supra note 1, arts. XXXVI-XXXVIII.
207. Id.
208. GATr RULES AND ACTIVITIES RELATING TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, ANNEX, Ministerial
Declaration, Nov. 29, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 22 (1983).
209. Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203 (1980).
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premise of "non-discrimination" among nations. Despite this fact, the
agreement specifically encourages discrimination in favor of less-developed
countries. By doing so, the agreement implicitly recognizes that its mandates
must always be adjusted to take into consideration the various stages of
development of its Member States. Thus, the argument that the security
exception must be immune from such considerations loses much of its
persuasiveness.
The most relevant statement in this regard is found in article XXXVII,
paragraph 3(c). It provides that the developed contracting parties shall "have
special regard to the trade interests of less-developed contracting parties when
considering the application of other measures permitted under this Agreement.
: ,*210 It could be argued that this article was not meant to encompass the
invocation of the security exception and that its mandates should be limited to
such "other measures" as those surrounding article XIX, subsidies, dumping,
and the like.211 On the other hand, it can also be argued that the degree of
hardship imposed by any given (or particular) restraint on trade does not vary
in accordance with the ground upon which it is based. A quota on sugar
imposed pursuant to article XIX, for example, will have the same effect on a
less-developed exporting nation as an identical quota imposed under article
XXI. Since article XXXVII(3)(c) is aimed at restrictions that are admittedly
lawful or permitted under the agreement, it should not stretch the imagination
too far to suggest that nations considering a valid exercise of the security
exception be bound to consider the developmental status of their potential
targets.2
12
Several nations have, in fact, argued that such a relationship exists
between article XXI and paragraph 3(c) of article XXXVII (and between
article XXI and Part IV in general). In regard to the U.S. embargo of
Nicaragua, for example, the Egyptian representative indicated that when
invoking the provisions of article XXI, "due regard should be given to the
essential interests of developing countries in the spirit of Part IV" and that
"particular attention should be drawn to Article XXXVII:3(c). 213 Numerous
other States also took the position that special caution should be used when
the target is a developing country and that the U.S. actions against Nicaragua
214actually violated Part IV of the Agreement. In so arguing, these nations
were recognizing a fundamental nexus between the decision to exercise the
security exception and the developmental status of the target country.
210. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXXVII, para. 3(c) (emphasis added).
211. "According to the 1976 Secretariat Note on the application of Part IV, the drafting history
of Part IV shows that 'escape clause action and countervailing and anti-dumping duties' were among the
'other measures' intended as being subject to the provisions of Article XXXVII: 3(c)." GATT
ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 10, at 1065-67.
212. In this regard it is worthy of note that Lawrence Boisson de Chazoumes, in discussing the
costs of countermeasures, has indicated that there are costs "of a macro-economic nature depending
upon the degree of development of a country and the extent of its integration into the world economy."
Panel, The Costs and Benefits (remarks by Laurence Boisson de Chazoumes), supra note 10, at 340.
213. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 29, 1985, GATT Doc. C/M/188, at 12
(June 28, 1985).




The duty to consider the developmental status of the target nation can
also be based upon a sense of fundamental fairness. Developing countries, and
especially least-developed countries, generally have no ability to retaliate, no
ability to receive compensation for damages incurred, and no ability to
achieve any sort of effective redress under the nullification or impairment
provisions of article XXIII.215 The suspension of concessions or other
obligations on the part of the target is truly meaningless when a two-way
embargo has been imposed.216
As a result, there is very little impetus for developed countries to avoid
"wrongful" decisions. If one may assume, for the sake of argument, that a
developed country "wrongfully" imposes a security-based economic sanction,
it need not fear the imposition of any penalty. In this sense, the developed
country actually has very little to lose. In light of political expediencies at
home, it thus becomes apparent that political leaders may err on the side of
imposing the sanction. Unfortunately, a politically convenient decision
(resulting in little or no adverse effect on the invoker) may have a devastating
effect on the trade of a developing country, on its ability to service foreign
debt, and on its ability to experience growth and development.217
Finally, incorporating the developmental status of a potential target into
the decision-making process may help alleviate some of the tensions
surrounding North/South relations. Whether or not one agrees with the
argument that the security exception is a mechanism by which richer nations
impose their will upon the poor, it is quite clear that many nations have the
perception that the use of security-based sanctions is substantially a reflection
of North/South issues and power differentials. 218 Economic sanctions may
only be effectively employed by those with economic strength and the history
of economic sanctions supports the argument that targets tend to be
economically weak and lacking in the ability to retaliate.219 Additionally,
barring such threats as chemical or biological terrorism, the threat posed by a
weaker nation is less than that posed by one with substantial economic,
political and military strength. As a result, it has been asserted that the use of
these inherently discriminatory economic sanctions sets a dangerous precedent
215. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on Apr. 3, 1990, GATT Doc. C/M240, at 31
(May 4, 1990); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on July 17-19, 1985, GATT Doc. C/M1191, at
42 (Sep. 11, 1985); Council of Representatives, Report on Work since the Thirty-Seventh Session,
GATT Doc. L/5414, at 17 (Nov. 12, 1982); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 7, 1982,
GATT Doc. C/M/157, at 2 (June 22, 1982).
216. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on Nov. 5, 1986, GATT Doc. CIM/204, at 8, 9
(Nov. 19, 1986); Unpublished Panel Report on United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua,
1986 WL 363154, U6053, 1.2,4.14 (Oct. 13, 1986) (unadopted).
217. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS29/R, 4.26-.27 (June
16, 1994); United States-Measures Affecting Cuban Sugar Exports, GATT Doc. L/5980, at 1 (Apr. 10,
1986); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on July 17-19, 1985, GATT Doc. CM./191, at 5, 41
(Sep. 11, 1985); Trade Restrictions Affecting Argentina Applied for Non-economic Reasons, GATT
Doc. L/5317, at 1 (Apr. 30, 1982).
218. See, e.g., GAIT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on June 29-30, 1982, GATT Doc.
C/M/159, at 13-22 (Aug. 10, 1982); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 7, 1982, GATT
Doc. CIM/157, at 3-13 (June 22, 1982). For a listing of those nations supporting Nicaragua's request for
the establishment of a panel, see GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on July 17-19, 1985, GATT
Doc. C/M/191, at 42 (Sep. 11, 1985).
219. See, e.g., GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 95 (2d
ed. 1990).
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"with severe consequences for the future of developing countries, 220 and that
the most powerful of nations must therefore be bound to demonstrate "the
greatest self-restraint" in exercising the security exception.221
3. The Need to Consider Relative Impact
A security-based sanction imposed by an industrialized nation and a
security-based sanction imposed by a less-developed nation may be
generically identical. Each of these nations, for example, may choose to
impose a two-way embargo against a target whose activities are threatening
the essential security interests of both. The impact of these sanctions,
however, will often be substantially different.
There is no question that a sanction imposed by an economic power
against a less-developed target will have a considerable influence on the
social, political, and economic well-being of that taiget. This is especially true
because the invoking State will often be a major purchaser of the target's
primary exports, a major supplier of needed imports, and a major source of
financial aid. Additionally, the invoking State's political clout may reduce the
ability of the target to seek alternative sources of supply and demand. The
abrupt termination of these relationships creates extraordinary economic and
social consequences for a dependent country and may not only temporarily
interrupt, but substantially reverse, its social and economic development.
Sanctions may indeed have "costs of a macro-economic nature depending
upon the degree of development of a country and the extent of its integration
into the world economy."222 In contrast, an identical sanction imposed by a
smaller nation that engages in limited trade with the target (and provides no
external financing) would have only a marginal impact on the health of the
target.
Any impact assessment should encompass not only an analysis of the
immediate effect of the sanction but an examination of the effects that such an
interruption in social and economic intercourse will have on the nation's
ability to pursue future growth and development.223 The inclusion of an
element of "time" would serve to recognize that the impact of any given
sanction may increase exponentially over its duration. Certainly the
imposition of a two-way embargo for a period of one or two years could have
a substantial adverse effect on a target. Sanctions imposed over the course of
twenty or thirty years, however, could alter the fundamental character of a
nation and its people. Not only can long-term sanctions breed a generation of
animosity and distrust, they can create a generation that has experienced
220. Trade Restrictions Affecting Argentina Applied for Non-economic Reasons, GATT Doc.
C/M/ 157, at 3 (June 22, 1982) (quoting a statement made by the representative of Argentina at a GATT
Council meeting held on 7 May 1982).
221. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on Nov. 5, 1986, GATT Doc. CM204, at 13
(Nov. 19, 1986) (quoting a statement made by the representative of Hungary at a GATT Council
meeting held on 5 and 6 November 1982).
222. Panel, The Costs and Benefits, supra note 10, at 340 (remarks by Laurence Boisson de
Chazournes).
223. Panel, The Costs and Benefits, supra, note 10, at 359 (remarks by NV. Michael Reisman)
("[T]he mid-term and long-term, as well as the short-term consequences of prospective economic
sanctions must be projected and appraised.").
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nothing but a life of poverty and dependence upon the State. They can create a
generation that lacks the education, technological expertise, and
entrepreneurial skills necessary to compete in a global market.
This is not to imply that strong nations should not impose security-based
sanctions against the weak or that some minimum developmental threshold
should be established. Even the least-developed of countries must sometimes
bear the consequences of its actions. What is being argued is that such long-
term consequences should be considered when deciding whether the "degree"
of a particular course of action is truly necessary in light of the security threat
being posed and the objectives being sought. Such a decision-making process
would recognize that sanctions specifically directed at tangible, identifiable
threats, and that are supported by the international community, are more likely
to be successful within a limited time frame. On the other hand, "security-
based" sanctions that are designed to alter the fundamental political and
economic structures of another nation, that are based upon security threats
which are ill-defined by nebulous or broadly encompassing terms, and that
politically preclude any future admission of failure, tend to run the risk of
lengthy imposition and exponential impact.224 As a result, any decision to
impose a security-based sanction should be based not only upon the existence
of a real or perceived threat to national security (as opposed to a desire to
punish or to influence the lawful behavior of another sovereign), but upon the
likelihood that the sanction will achieve its valid security purpose within a
time frame that reflects the relationship between the degree of the threat being
posed and the degree of hardship being effected.
4. The Need to Consider the Consistency/Likelihood of Success
Dichotomy
Because the security exception is designed to allow nations to protect
their essential security interests, it would seem logical that any decisions to
invoke this exception would include consideration of the likelihood that the
imposed sanctions would be successful in accomplishing their protective
purpose. If the sanctions are truly incapable of alleviating the threat to
security, or are indeed irrelevant to the threat being imposed, one might ask
why they are being employed and whether they should be granted the
immunity from international scrutiny that is apparently provided by this
particular exception. Sanctions imposed to influence the lawful decisions of
other nations or to punish a nation for unacceptable (though non-threatening)
conduct should in fact be judged in light of the substantive and procedural
limitations provided for in such international agreements as the U.N. Charter
and the United Nations Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations.225
The fact that the "likelihood of success" should be a criterion when
deciding whether to impose a security-based sanction is not unprecedented.
The Export Administration Act of 1979,226 for example, demands that export
224. For a discussion regarding the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of sanctions, see GARY
CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 95 (2d ed. 1990).
225. See supra notes 142-181 and accompanying text.
226. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (1994 & Supp. I 1997).
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controls be consistently judged in terms of their effectiveness in advancing
national security and foreign policy interests. This act is extremely cognizant
of the fact that export controls can be quite ineffective in the face of
substantial foreign availability or where the reaction of other nations would
render the controls ineffective. Absent the ability to effectively enforce the
controls or absent the ability to achieve intended purposes, the controls should
be discarded.227
While export controls can undoubtedly be distinguished from broader
economic sanctions, the purpose of protecting essential security interests is
often common to both forms of restrictive activity. As a result, if
"ineffectiveness" is indeed a consideration when contemplating the imposition
of a security-based export control, it should also be a consideration when
contemplating the use of sanctions under the security exception. The fact that
the former may more directly reflect the political influence of domestic
industries is not a satisfactory basis upon which to create a distinction.
The likelihood of success of any economic sanction, including security-
based sanctions, will depend upon a variety of circumstances. Both the nature
and the magnitude of the goals or purposes of the sanction will affect the
probability that those goals will be achieved. A major study of economic
sanctions found that sanctions tend to be more effective when their goals are
"relatively modest," thus reducing both the importance of international
cooperation and the likelihood that rival powers will step in to provide
assistance to the target.228 On the other hand, efforts to bring about major
policy changes on the part of an adversary have "succeeded only
infrequently. 229
The relationship between "success" and "purpose" can become quite
nebulous. Not only must the goals of the sanction policy be identified and
defined, those goals may change or evolve substantially over the life of the
sanction. 230 Nevertheless, three observations should be borne in mind. First,
there need be no expectation that a security-based sanction will be successful
either immediately or within a short period of time, since the desired effects of
a sanction may in fact increase, or decrease, over its duration.231 However, it
is also true that a sanction that is likely to succeed only over a substantial
number of years is also more likely to impose a disproportionate impact on the
target. Second, in undertaking the difficult task of establishing the goals of a
227. See, e.g., id. app. §§ 2404(f), 2405(b)(1)(A)-(E), 2413(a)(11). In regard to the Act's
various provisions on foreign availability, see id. app. §§ 2403(c), 2404(c)(3), 2404(d)(2), 2404(d)(4),
2404(f), 2404(h)(6), 2405(b), 2405(f)(2), 2405(h), and 2405(o). For a somewhat contrary stance
regarding the relevance of foreign availability, see National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 1322, 110 Stat. 478 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §2404 (Supp. IV 1998)
(National Security Implications of United States Export Policy). For a discussion of the concept of
foreign availability, see Gaugh, supra note 10, at 74-78.
228. Panel, The Gulf War, supra note 10, at 172 (remarks by Kimberly Ann Elliott). The
remarks of Ms. Elliott were based in large part on GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 95 (2d ed. 1990).
229. Panel, The Guif War, supra note 10, at 172 (remarks by Kimberly Ann Elliott).
230. Panel, Effects and Effectiveness, supra note 10, at 208 (remarks by Michael P. Malloy);
Panel, The Gulf War, supra note 10, at 185-86 (remarks by Danforth Newcomb) (citing shifts in the
goals of sanctions against Iraq). For a discussion on the potential relevance of purpose or intent, see
Cameron, supra note 10, at 238-41.
231. Panel, Effects and Effectiveness, supra note 10, at 206 (remarks by Michael P. Malloy).
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security-based sanction, nations should limit their analysis (by definition) to
alleviating the threats being posed to their essential security interests. Broad
foreign policy concerns and even laudable philosophical ideas should not be
addressed under the auspices of the security exception, but should instead be
handled on a more multilateral basis and subjected to greater international
scrutiny. Third, any decision regarding the establishment of goals and the
imposition of sanctions to accomplish those goals should be made in light of
the realities of international relations. In this regard, nations must recognize
the fundamental fact that unilaterally imposed sanctions have generally
yielded less than stellar results.
232
In addition to both foreign availability (which can render ineffective
one-half of a two-way embargo) and the nature and magnitude of purpose, the
likelihood of success of a security-based sanction can be analyzed in light of
several other factors as well. According to Elliott, sanctions in general tend to
be more effective when the invoker can avoid incurring high costs to itself,
when the invoker accounts for a large portion of the target's trade, when the
sanction can be imposed quickly and decisively with substantial costs to the
target, and when the invoker and the target are generally friendly toward one
another and conduct a substantial degree of economic intercourse.
Unfortunately, while the likelihood of success should be considered
when contemplating the imposition of a security-based sanction, the use of
such a criterion is inherently discriminatory. One of the primary factors in
determining the likelihood of success is the strength of the invoking nation
relative to its target.234 When the target is a small developing country, lacking
in the ability to retaliate, and substantially dependent upon the invoker in
terms of both trade and economic assistance, the costs to the target tend to rise
and the costs to the invoker tend to fall.
The problem, of course, is that the use of this criterion runs directly
counter to another important consideration discussed earlier, namely the need
to consider the target's stage of development. 235 As was noted previously, one
of the fundamental objectives of the WTO is to provide the opportunity for
less-developed countries to share in an increasing pool of global wealth, and
the WTO has always accorded special treatment to these nations in an attempt
to advance such a purpose. The use of the "likelihood of success" criterion
tends to ignore the spirit of Part IV of the Agreement. It tends to perpetuate
232. See generally, Gaugh, supra note 10, at 86-87; Panel, The Gulf War, supra note 10, at
172-73 (remarks by Kimberly Ann Elliott) (analyzing the effectiveness of sanctions); Schmitt, supra
note 24, at 4; Panel, Effects and Effectiveness, supra note 10, at 211 (remarks by Covey T. Oliver)
(stating that unilateral sanctions by the U.S. severely hindered Chile's economic development).
233. Panel, The Gulf War, supra note 10, at 172-73, 174 (remarks by Kimberly Ann Elliott). In
order to place these criteria in their proper perspective, it may be noted that Ms. Elliott pointed out that
"our goal was to develop a set of recommendations for making sanctions a more effective foreign policy
tool. We were interested in the instrumental use of sanctions, not in their use for domestic political or
international signaling purposes. An instrumental use of sanctions is one in which the sanctions were
intended to achieve a specific change in the policies, capabilities, or government of a foreign country."
Id. at 170 (emphasis in original). See also GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
RECONSIDERED 95 (2d ed. 1990).
234. Panel, The Gulf War, supra note 10, at 172.
235. See supra Part III.B.2 and accompanying notes.
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the use of power-based relations, degrades the concept of sovereignty, and
encourages a fundamental distrust between the rich and the poor.236
Finally, the use of this criterion raises substantial questions regarding the
issue of consistency. The U.N. Charter is based upon the fundamental
principle of the "sovereign equality" of all of its members,237 and each
member has pledged to recognize the "equal rights ... of nations large and
small. '235 Similarly, all contracting parties to the WTO have recognized that
the rules and procedures of the WTO system must be "fairly applied" and that
the "consistency" of the system must be preserved.239
Nevertheless, security-based sanctions continue to be employed on a
selective basis. Despite the fact that various countries pose similar threats to
the security interests of the United States, for example, our responses to those
threats have varied substantially in light of the relative importance of the
particular countries involved. As a result, the United States has not only been
questioned in regard to its motives, but it has also been the subject of
legitimate allegations of hypocrisy.
The Cuban embargo tends to underscore the double standard that applied
when responding to perceived threats to essential security interests. Despite
the fact that the Pentagon has concluded that Cuba no longer poses any
significant threat to U.S. security, 240 the United States has continued its
embargo on the basis of security concerns specifically surrounding, at least in
part, the violation of fundamental human rights.241 The maintenance of these
sanctions has given rise to the question of whether the United States would
impose such an embargo against a more powerful nation or a more significant
trading partner under similar circumstances. In light of the fact that security-
based sanctions have not been applied to other nations with less than laudable
human rights records, the answer to this question has become quite obvious.
The very different trade policies implemented by the United States
towards Cuba and China illustrate such hypocrisy. President Clinton indicated
that China has been "on the wrong side of history" regarding human rights.
242
However, rather than viewing these human rights violations as a threat to U.S.
security (as has been the case with the violations in Cuba), the President chose
to increase trade between the two nations in the hope that additional economic
relationships would spur the democratic process. 243 Additionally, the
legislation enacted in 2000 that will extend normal trade relations treatment tothe People's Republic of China244 specifically recognizes that "the human
236. Id.
237. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1.
238. Id. pmbl.
239. Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 29, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 11 (1983).
240. Marquis, supra note 118.
241. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (Helms-Burton Act) § 2(24),
22 U.S.C. § 6021(24) (1997). See also id. §§ 6021(20)-(28), 6031(1). But see Trade Sanctions Reform
and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, H.R. 5426, 106th Cong. §§903-904 (2000) (enacted) (easing of
unilateral agricultural and medical sanctions).
242. Craig R. Whitney, Dissents on Iran and Iraq; Carrots-for-China Policy Haunts U.S. in the
Gulf, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1997, § 4, at I.
243. Id.
244. Normal Trade Relations for the People's Republic of China, Pub. L. No. 106-286, 114
Stat. 880 (2000). This Act does not in and of itself grant normal trade relations to China, but instead
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rights record of the People's Republic of China is a matter of very serious
concern" 245 and that "Congress deplores violations by the [Chinese]
Government... of human rights, religious freedoms, and worker rights...
,246 On the other hand, the legislation also recognizes that the trade in goods
between China and the United States totaled almost ninety-five billion dollars
in 1999,247 and that China's commitments pursuant to its WTO accession
would, if realized, "provide considerable opportunities for United States
farmers, businesses, and workers.2 48 The existence of such a dichotomy,
however, should not imply in any way that the use of security-based sanctions
should be increased or that an embargo should be imposed against the
People's Republic of China. Instead, the reasons that the United States has not
imposed sanctions against China should be used to examine and reevaluate
U.S. policy toward Cuba. Security-based sanctions should only be imposed
consistently and their use as a convenient, low-cost, foreign policy tool
against weaker nations should be discouraged.
Additionally, a nation's particular response to a perceived security threat
can apparently be influenced by the needs of its domestic industries. U.S.
sanctions against India and Pakistan, for example, were imposed in response
to nuclear tests being conducted by those two nations. 249 These sanctions,
however, exempted both food exports and the export of fertilizer.250 While
one might hope that these exceptions were based on humanitarian concerns, it
would appear that the former exemption was primarily a response to farmers
in the Pacific Northwest (who would have been barred from bidding on a
thirty-seven million dollar wheat order from Pakistan) and that the latter
exemption was based upon the fact that India was the second-largest importer
of American phosphate fertilizer.251 Similarly, the Trade Sanctions Reform
and Export Enhancement Act of 2000252 was designed to appease U.S.
farmers and other agricultural interests by way of easing sanctions regarding
agricultural sales.253 In order to appease the politically important anti-Castro
Cuban-American community, however, the Act simultaneously prohibits any




It can be argued that the concerns of domestic industries may be relevant
to the development of a nation's "foreign policy." On the other hand, it can
also be argued that these concerns should not be treated as relevant when
contemplating the use of a security-based sanction and that they should not be
allowed to influence the manner in which a nation perceives, or responds to, a
authorizes the President to do so after China actually gains accession to the WTO and the President
certifies that the terms and conditions for the accession are at least equivalent to those agreed between
the United States and China on Nov. 15th, 1999. Id. §§ 101(b), 102(a).
245. Id. §202(11).
246. Id. § 202(12).
247. Id. § 202(4).
248. Id. § 411(4).
249. Schmitt, supra note 24, at 4.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, H.R. 5426, 106th Cong.
§901 (2000) (enacted).
253. Id. § 903.
254. Id. § 908.
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potential security risk. As a result, the development and implementation of
broad foreign policy objectives must in fact be distinguished from the
imposition of security sanctions. If sanctions are to be invoked in a consistent
and nondiscriminatory manner, they cannot be dependant upon the relative
importance of the target to domestic business. Additionally, the existence of
selective application would seem to indicate that a sanction is more foreign-
policy oriented than security based and would raise questions regarding the
degree to which the invoking nation actually considers the sanction necessary
for insuring its essential security interests.
Finally, any use of a "likelihood of success" criterion, at least when
contemplating sanctions against another member of the United Nations or
WTO, must give some credence to the concept of "good faith., 255 While
certainly a nebulous mandate, the requirement of good faith has been
consistently adopted throughout the law of treaties.256 The 1969 Vienna
Convention, the primary authority in this regard, indicates that States must
"refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty, 257
and that "every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith. '258 Similarly, all members of the WTO have
agreed to apply the WTO Agreement "fairly" and with "consistency,"2 59 while
all members of the United Nations have pledged to "fulfill in good faith the
obligations assumed by them" under the Charter.2
60
This standard of good faith, while perhaps not sufficiently concrete to
judge the motives of a nation, should be sufficiently clear to prohibit
discriminatory actions. If two nations are posing a substantially similar threat
to the essential security interests of another nation, the imposition of sanctions
against one and not the other would seem to violate these requirements of
good faith and fundamental fairness. To demand at least some measure of
consistency would tend to de-politicize the decision-making process and
would remove the tendency to err on the side of imposition when a weaker
target is involved. A nation contemplating the use of a security-based sanction
against a poorer neighbor should query whether it would impose such a
sanction against a significant trading partner under similar circumstances.
5. Necessity, Exhaustion, and the Least Restrictive Alternative
In determining whether to impose a security-based sanction, and in
determining the actual magnitude of that sanction, a nation should consider
whether its actions are in fact "necessary"; whether it has exhausted its
options for negotiation and consultation; and whether the measures being
255. See, e.g., Hahn, supra note 10, at 583, 599-601, 605; Henderson, supra note 10, at 190
n.n. 154 & 155; Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, Competition, Competition Policy, and the
GATT, 22 (The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1228, 1993); Knoll, supra note 10, at
586-90.
256. See Panel, The Costs and Benefits, supra note 10, at 340-41 (remarks by Laurence
Boisson de Chazoumes).
257. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331,336.
258. Id., art. 26.
259. Ministerial Declaration, November 29, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 11 (1983).
260. U.N. CHARTER art. 2:2.
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taken represent the least restrictive means for achieving their desired results.
Of course, these three concepts will often prove to be interdependent. It could
be argued, for example, that if a less restrictive means is available for
accomplishing the goals being sought, then a more restrictive measure would
not in fact be "necessary" under such a circumstance. Similarly, if a nation has
chosen not to exhaust potentially promising mechanisms for negotiation and
consultation, the imposition of a sanction would not be "necessary" at least at
that particular point in time. Further, a security-based sanction whose degree
of impact far -exceeds the degree of the threat being posed would arguably be
"unnecessary" to the extent of that differential.
These concepts have been recognized in a variety of contexts in the
international arena. For example, article 33 of the U.N. Charter261 requires
parties involved in a dispute that is likely to endanger international peace and
security to "first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement . . . or other peaceful means of
their own choice. 2 62 In terms of WTO obligations, the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade provides that technical regulations shall not create
"unnecessary obstacles" to trade and "shall not be more trade-restrictive than
necessary" to fulfill legitimate objectives (including those objectives related to
national security).263 Similarly, the Agreement on Safeguards provides that
such measures shall be applied "only to the extent necessary" to prevent
serious injury264 and article XX of the GATT limits the use of several General
Exceptions through the imposition of a "necessary" requirement z. 6
With regard to exhaustion, article XXII requires each contracting party
to afford "adequate opportunity for consultation regarding . . . any matter
affecting the operation" of the agreement. z66 The Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes267 reiterates the WTO's
resolve "to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of the consultation
procedures ' 268 and to afford "adequate opportunity for consultation. 2 69 In
order to do so, the Understanding requires (assuming a request has been
made) that the parties engage in good faith consultations with a view toward
reaching a "mutually satisfactory solution.2 70 It also provides that parties
should attempt to obtain satisfactory adjustment "before resorting to further
action" under this Understanding 71 and it encourages the use of good offices,conciliation, mediation, 72 and arbitration procedures. 73 Finally, in specific
261. Id., art. 33.
262. Id.
263. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, art. 2, para. 2, supra note 165, at 122.
264. Agreement on Safeguards, art. 5.1, supra note 167, at 277. See also GATT, supra note 1,
art. XIX:I (a) ("to the extent and for such a time as may be necessary").
265. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(a), (b), (d), (i).
266. Id., art. XXII, para. 1.
267. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Goveming the Settlement of Disputes, supra note
17.
268. Id., art. 4, para. 1.
269. Id., art. 4, para. 2.
270. Id., art. 4, para. 3.
271. Id., art. 4, para. 5.
272. Id., art. 5.
273. Id., art. 25.
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regard to less-developed countries, the GATT provides that a developed
contracting party shall "explore all possibilities of constructive remedies"
before applying measures against a less-developed member.2 74
The security exception provided for in article XXI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade states that nothing in the Agreement shall
prevent a contracting party from taking any action which "it considers
necessary" for the protection of its essential security interests.2 75 Despite the
"it considers" qualifier, article XXI's inclusion of the word "necessary" is
clearly not without meaning. Even if it is assumed that the article's "it
considers necessary" language establishes a self-defining nature for essential
security interests, an invoking nation would still have the duty to address the
necessity issue. The fact that a nation's ultimate decision may not be
reviewable by an external body does not relieve that nation from its obligation
to engage in its own analysis of whether the measure being contemplated is
necessary.
When engaging in such an analysis, nations must recognize that
security-based sanctions are not "necessary" merely because they are
"useful," 276 or merely because they "tend" to protect essential security
interests.277 Similarly, sanctions are not "necessary" merely because they are
politically expedient, philosophically defensible, or free from substantial costs
to the invoker. Instead, a measure can be viewed as necessary when it
conforms to the expectations of the international community.
In United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, a GATT Panel
examined the issue of "necessity" in substantial detail.278 While this
examination focused on the "necessary" requirement found in article XX, the
panel's findings are nevertheless relevant. In this regard, the primary
difference between the "necessary" language of article XX and the "it
considers necessary" language of article XXI involves the issue of "who" is
entitled to make the relevant determination. While the necessity of an article
XX measure is subject to judicial scrutiny and the necessity of an article XXI
measure is arguably not, there is no reason to believe that the singular term
"necessary" should be defined in different ways under the two provisions.
Stated alternatively, the "it considers" and "necessary" language can be
separated into two distinct concepts. While the former is directed at the issue
of potential reviewability (and implies that decisions to invoke article XXI
may be subject only to internal analysis), the latter term should arguably
remain a definitional constant.
In the Tuna case, the United States argued that the term "necessary"
should simply be defined as that which is "needed. 2 79 It argued that "any
interpretation of this word as meaning 'least inconsistent' with the General
274. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXXVII, para. 3(c) (discussing the use of countermeasures and
the exhaustion of settlement procedures). See also Panel, The Costs and Benefits, supra note 10, at 339
(remarks by Laurence Boisson de Chazoumes).
275. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXI (b).
276. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 117 (June 27).
277. Id. at 141.
278. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc DS29/R, 3.63-.81, 4.30,




Agreement" would be "needlessly complex and unpredictable. 28 0 It would
require a nation to prove the non-existence of other measures and to establish
a range of available alternatives and "rank them according to 'least
inconsistency' with the provisions of the General Agreement."
281
In contrast, the EEC argued that the term "necessary" actually means
"indispensable," "requisite, .... inevitably determined," or "unavoidable."282 It
is a term that implies that there is "no other way or means to achieve" a
desired policy objective.283 As a result, a measure that is otherwise
inconsistent with the GATT could only be justified as "necessary" if "there
was no alternative measure... that was either consistent or less inconsistent
with other GATT provisions., 2'84 Similarly, the government of Costa Rica
argued that the U.S. measures were not necessary "since the United States
could not claim that it had exhausted all existing possibilities of achieving its
goal. 285 Specific solutions, such as those involving international negotiation,
"had been disregarded by the United States."
286
After weighing these various arguments, the GATT Panel basically
assumed the position advanced by the EEC. It held that "in the ordinary
meaning of the term, 'necessary' meant that no alternative existed., 287 In so
holding, the court observed that:
[A] contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with another GATT provision
as "necessary" . . . if an alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to
employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is available to it. By
the same token, in cases where a measure consistent with other GATT provisions is not
reasonably available, a contracting party is bound to use, among the measures reasonably
available to it, that which entails the least degree of inconsistency with other GAT
provisions.
28S
Admittedly in the context of article XX measures, the concept of
necessity was tied to both the "exhaustion" and "least trade-restrictive
alternative" doctrines. As a result, although a decision regarding what is
"necessary" to protect essential security interests may actually reside with the
nation invoking article XXI, the same form of analysis should be applied by
that nation in its decision-making process.
Finally, as has been argued by W. Michael Reisman, parallels can be
drawn between the use of highly coercive economic sanctions (which, one can
assume, would include security-based measures) and the law of armed
conflict.289 In this regard, Reisman argues that the requirements for the lawful
use of force, such as necessity and the ability to discriminate between









288. Id. (quoting United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GAIT
B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 392-93 (1990)).
289. Panel, The Costs and Benefits, supra note 10, at 350-60 (remarks by W. Michael
Reisman).
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coercive economic sanctions and that such a test should be applied before the
decision to institute such a sanction is made.290 He argues that an economic
sanctions program, in order to be lawful, "must undertake a preliminary
'impact assessment' study' 291 to weigh the potential collateral damage of
different strategic options and that the strategic option ultimately selected
must minimize such damage "to the extent possible., 292 While phrased in
somewhat different terms, these arguments strongly support the suggestion
that the concepts of necessity, exhaustion, and least restrictive alternative
should be incorporated into a nation's article XXI analysis.
6. The Need to Consider the Effect on Non-target Nations
In contemplating the use of a security-based sanction, a nation should
also consider the potential effects of the sanction on third-party (non-target)
countries. Addressing such an obligation in general terms, the 1982
Ministerial Declaration 293 provided that the contracting parties, both in the
application of measures and in the exercise of GATT rights, should give
"fullest consideration . . . to the trading interests of other contracting
parties. 294 Thus, it could certainly be argued that even if the imposition of an
article XXI sanction lies within the "rights" of a contracting party, that party is
not simply free to disregard the trading interests of other affected States.
Moreover, in the Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General
Agreement,2 95 the Contracting Parties specifically recognized that when
taking action pursuant to the exceptions contained in article XXI, a nation
"should take into consideration the interests of third parties which may be
affected" by that action.
296
Such a recognition reflects the fact that the impact of economic
sanctions is almost never limited to the target State. Customer nations,
supplier nations, and neighbors are inevitably affected by the sanction,
particularly when their economies are fragile, their resources are limited, or
their social and political structures are unstable. A target State, for example,
might be the primary supplier of a raw material or other needed input to
surrounding (non-target) countries. That input may be supplied to those
countries at low cost due to geographical proximity or the existence of a free
trade area or system of preferences. Because of its weakened financial
condition, however, the target may no longer be in the position to produce,
and then supply, those inputs. Such an argument was advanced by Nicaragua
when it noted that the U.S. embargo had caused serious adverse effects on the
290. Id. at 354-55. See also Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
103 (June 27) (arguing that whether self-defense is lawful "depends on observance of the criteria of the
necessity and the proportionality of the measures taken in self-defence").
291. Panel, The Costs and Benefits, supra note 10, at 359 (remarks by W. Michael Reisman).
292. Id. at 357.
293. Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 29, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 9 (1983).
294. Id. at 11.
295. Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement, Nov. 30, 1982, GATT




whole Central American Common Market.297 The embargo had reduced
Nicaragua's exports to the other members of the Common Market by twenty-
five percent, more than half of which consisted of industrial inputs and
intermediate goods for Central American industry.298
The weakened condition of the target may affect non-target nations in
other ways as well. Third countries may lose an important customer for their
goods and services, existing contracts may be interrupted or canceled, debts
may become uncollectable, balance of payments may be distorted, and higher
prices (when the target is a major producer) may be incurred.299 In addition to
these trade-related issues, third countries may also experience a variety of
social problems. For example, political and social unrest in the target nation
may easily spill over to neighboring countries. This is especially true when the
non-target nation experiences collateral economic hardship or houses factions
that are sympathetic to the plight of the target. Similarly, a sudden inflow of
refugees from the target nation can exhaust already limited social, medical,
and financial resources.
These effects, of course, may be magnified if the third country becomes
an actual "participant" in a security-based sanctions program originally
instituted unilaterally by another nation. A unilateral sanction that is imposed
by a powerful trading partner may indeed "summon" a variety of reluctant
participants. Third parties may in fact be coerced into participation through
threats of similar sanctions or through threats of reducing or eliminating
foreign aid.300
Under such circumstances, it can be argued that the "coercing" nation
should have the duty to compensate (or at least to assist) third nations that
experience substantial hardship as a result of their participation in the
sanctions program. This argument is supported by the fact that when a
sanctions program is imposed by the United Nations, rather than unilaterally,
some relief is indeed available. Article 50 of the U.N. Charter specifically
recognizes that sanctions can pose considerable difficulties for non-target
States that aid in the implementation of those U.N. sanctions.3"' Article 50
provides that when preventive or enforcement measures are taken by the
Security Council, any non-target State "confronted with special economic
problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right
to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those
problems." 302 In the case of the sanctions imposed against Iraq, for example,
the Security Council charged the Sanctions Committee with the task of
reviewing article 50 requests from States being confronted with such "special
297. Unpublished Panel Report on United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, 1986
WL 363154, L/6053, 4.11 (Oct. 13, 1986) (unadopted). The Central American Common Market
consisted of Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica. Id.
298. Id.
299. See Joyner, supra note 10, at 261, n.75 (providing an example of Romania's losses
following compliance with UN's sanction on Iraqi). In regard to higher prices, see also Panel, The Gulf
War, supra note 10, at 174 (remarks by Kimberly Ann Elliott).
300. See, e.g., Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, supra note 198.
301. U.N. CHARTER art. 50.
302. Id.
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economic problems., 30 3 According to Schlittler, twenty-one States had
requested article 50 consideration (as of March 18, 1991), and the working
group that heard those requests made recommendations, endorsed by both the
Sanctions Committee and the Security Council, "to appeal to all states on an
urgent basis to provide immediate assistance to the countries concerned and to
invite international institutions to upgrade their assistance programs with these
countries."
3°4
Finally, when analyzing the potential impact of a sanction on non-target
States, the invoking nation should also consider the effects of its actions on
the political and military stability of the region. Sanctions are sometimes
imposed in order to address or curtail instability in a troubled region. The
measures imposed by the European Community against the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, for example, were in part directed at the "political
instability" in that European region and its "potentially destabilizing
consequences elsewhere."3° Export control laws, and the sanctions applied in
the event of their breach, are similarly aimed at maintaining regional (as well
as global) military stability.306
Unfortunately, in certain circumstances, sanctions can actually
contribute to political instability and military imbalance as well. For example,
it is conceivable that the target State, while engaging in acts that arguably
threaten the security of the invoking nation, has historically played a
substantial leadership role in a particular geographic area and has provided a
stabilizing influence on the social, political, and economic fabric of that
region. The isolating effect of the sanction may be to remove such an
influence and to encourage a renewal of political, religious, or ethnic tensions.
Similarly, the crippling of the military potential of the target may, on a
relative basis, increase the military might of one of its neighbors. Such a
circumstance may incite the exercise of newly acquired power against either
the target itself or the target's protectorates or allies.
In either event, the imposition of security-based sanctions tends to
tamper with the existing balance of power. Such an interference may well
result in the taming of a rogue nation or the ouster of a tyrannical leader. On
the other hand, it may also lead to zealous parochial support for the target, a
total breakdown of mutual deference among adjoining nations, or a renewal of
historical divisions and hatreds. In light of this potential diversity of results, an
invoking nation must learn to accept the need for considering more thoroughly
the totality of its actions.
303. Panel, The Gulf War, supra note 10, at 179 (remarks by Gilberto Schlittler).
304. Id. For some brief comments regarding such assistance, see Panel, The Costs and Benefits,
supra note 10, at 359 (remarks by W. Michael Reisman), and Panel, The Costs and Benefits,
supra note 10, at 349 (remarks by Shigeo Kawagishi). Regarding costs bome by non-target
states, see Joyner, supra note 10, at 261-62, 268-69.
305. Trade Measures Taken by the European Community Against the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, GATT Doc. L/6948, at 1 (Dec. 2, 1991).




7. The Need to Quantify Essential Security Interests
a. An Overview
A "threat" to the essential security interests of a nation cannot be viewed
in a vacuum. A nation's response to a perceived security threat may have the
effect of removing or reducing the external threat being posed. On the other
hand, it may actually increase both the severity and the breadth of the
offensive behavior. Similarly, a response may serve to solidify the
international community in a global condemnation of the offending nation, or
it may serve to alienate important allies and spawn a deterioration in foreign
relations. Therefore, a nation considering the use of a security-based sanction
should refrain from focusing solely on the immediate (or singular) threat
being posed. Instead, a nation should examine the overall or net security gains
or losses that a particular response would engender.
The economic development and well-being of a nation will always be
the primary mechanism for defending essential security interests from external
threats. In an interdependent world, however, this well-being is fundamentally
linked to both free and open trade and congenial relationships among trading
partners. As Professor Jackson has noted, the trade policy of the United States
"is and has been to promote national security by expanding world trade. 30 7
As a result, the use of a security-based sanction, as well as the use of import
and export restrictions for national security purposes, must be viewed in the
broader context of a long-term economic welfare strategy that is inherently
dependent upon the reactions of other nations to restrictive practices. Security-
based restrictions on imports, for example, may actually diminish national
security by perpetuating inefficiency and by requiring trading concessions that
damage other sectors of domestic industry. 30 Export controls often foreclose
substantial foreign markets to domestic producers, reduce international
competitiveness, inhibit research and development, and reduce the overall
"economic national security" of a nation. 30 9 The imposition of sanctions, as
well as the attempt to coerce multilateral support, can give rise to retaliatory
actions that jeopardize essential security interests far more than the conduct of
the target State.
Such a recognition of the importance of international reaction and the
possibility that even legitimate foreign policy controls can be
counterproductive reflects an understanding of international relations that is
substantially lacking in the use of security-based measures. Sanctions imposed
for national security purposes tend to focus on singular issues or events.
Perhaps the failure to consider more fully the totality of an action reflects the
basic fear that threats to essential security interests go to the heart of national
sovereignty. On the other hand, such a failure may also reflect the fact that
security-based measures tend to be, at least domestically, both politically
justifiable and politically expedient. Criteria dealing with the protection of
307. JOHN H. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 948
(1977).
308. See Wilch, supra note 10, at 173-75 and 192-93.
309. Gaugh, supra note 10, at 61-62, 75-76, 93-94.
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vital interests, for example, are not designed to invoke an analysis of long-
term effects on international trade or to provide insight as to why restrictions
310
should not be applied. Instead, these criteria provide a potpourri of
justifications regarding why restrictions should be applied and they tend to
focus on protecting the short-term viability of domestic industries. Even more
pointedly, the vesting of unbridled discretion to impose security-based
sanctions is often unencumbered by any real substantive context or guiding
principles that could provoke an examination of the actual costs of a particular
sanction, rather than merely its benefits. 1 l
In order to determine the "net" security gain or loss resulting from the
imposition of a sanction, it is necessary to account for factors such as the
sanction's likelihood of success, the existence of foreign availability, the
effect on non-target States, and the disruption (or undermining) of the
multilateral trading system. These factors must always be viewed in light of
the need for consistency in application, predictability of conduct, and the
reasonable expectations of other nations.312 In addition, there are other factors
that must also be examined in order to more accurately determine the net gain
or loss from sanction activity, including the response of other nations to the
sanction, the sanction's effect on both foreign relations and the national
security of other nations, and the actual nature of the security threat.
b. The Need to Consider the Response of Third Party Nations
In the understandable pursuit of self-interest, States are constantly
negotiating a multitude of issues that encompass a variety of security and non-
security concerns. As a result, an individual goal must always be tempered or
balanced against other goals, and individual decisions must be made both
within this context of broad interaction and with an appreciation of the
realities of a quid-pro-quo political system.
Third-party nations that are dissatisfied with the imposition of a
security-based sanction may therefore express their frustration in a number of
different ways. Responses by a third party might include withdrawing its
support for a proposed environmental agreement, altering its position
regarding the relationship between trade and international labor standards, or
reducing its protection of intellectual property rights. From a national security
perspective, a nation might choose to retaliate by means of imposing trade
restrictions against the invoking nation; it might increase its financial aid to
the target country; it might refuse to support a new weapons treaty or to honor
other (unrelated) sanctioning activity; or it might withdraw its funding or
military personnel from other strategic areas of the world.
The need to consider net security gains and losses within such an
environment was quite clear in the recent negotiations between the United
310. See, e.g., Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 232(d), 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d).
311. See, e.g., International Emergency Economic Powers Act § 201, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994
& Supp. III 1997).
312. For a brief discussion of 'reasonable expectations' see Unpublished Panel Report on
United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, 1986 WL 363154, L/6053, 4.8-.9 (Oct. 13,
1986) (unadopted); Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra note 255, at 22, 24-25; and JACKSON, WORLD TRADE
AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 3, at 182-83.
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States and the European Union regarding the enforcement of Helms-Burton
313
and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act.314 Pursuant to these negotiations, President
Clinton waived sanctions against three foreign companies doing business in
Iran and promised to seek legislation to prevent sanctions against businesses
operating in Cuba.315 In exchange for these concessions, the EU and Russia
agreed to tighten their controls over the export of weapons technology to
Iran.316 Administration officials indicated that these agreements "had taken the
poison out of two vicious disputes that had affected Washington's ability to
win European support on other matters." 317 They argued that these
concessions would encourage Europe and Russia to cooperate with the United
States in isolating Iraq and in addressing the financial crises in Asia. They also
thought the concessions would encourage Russia to ratify the Start II nuclear
arms control treaty.318 One may assume that in the absence of such
concessions, the pursuit of these other important national security goals would
be jeopardized.
Similarly, one might question whether there is a net gain to national
security when a sanction serves to intensify existing divisions between North
and South or between rich and poor. Certainly the sanctions imposed against
Nicaragua served to solidify Southern opposition to U.S. foreign policy.
319
The Helms-Burton Act was condemned by the twenty-seven member states of
the Latin American Economic System as a violation of international law and
the principle of sovereignty,320 and some believe that its unilateral imposition
without consultation may harm future diplomatic relations3 21 by complicating
the accession of Chile to NAFTA and by hampering the creation of the Free
Trade Area of the Americas.
322
On the other hand, the United States has also recognized that security-
based restrictions should be viewed in light of "our entire foreign trade and
foreign relations" agenda.323 It has been noted that such restrictions may
undercut our leadership in the fight to liberalize trade; provide other countries
with an excuse for using the security exception for protectionist purposes;
damage our relationships with nations that have joined in common defense
arrangements; and weaken the economies of our allies by foreclosing
substantial markets for their exports. 32 4 Taking these admissions to their
logical conclusion, trade restrictions, as well as the coercion of third nations
313. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (Helms-Burton Act), Pub. L.
No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6021 (1997)).
314. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172. 110 Stat. 1541 (codified at 50
U.S.C. 1701 (Supp. IV 1998)).




319. See, e.g., GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on Nov. 5, 1986, GATT Doc.
C/M/204, at 6-18 (Nov. 19, 1986) and GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 29, 1985,
GATT Doc. C/M/188, at 2-17 (June 28, 1985).
320. Cata, supra note 194, at 529.
321. Giesze, supra note 10, at 87, 91-92.
322. Id. at 87.
323. Restrictions on Imports of Dairy Products Into the United States, GATT Doc.
CP.6128/Add.1, at 13 (Sept. 24, 1951).
324. Id.at4-5,8-9, 11, 14-16.
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into participation in sanctions programs, could ultimately endanger the
national security of the United States by endangering the national security of
our allies. Weakening the economic health of friendly nations, either by
reducing the level of their exports or by denying them needed imports, will
inevitably affect the essential security interests of the invoking nation.
In contemplating the use of a security-based sanction, a nation should
also consider the likelihood of countervailing measures. The Helms-Burton
Act, for example, led to the enactment of a variety of blocking statutes by
Mexico, Canada, and the European Union. 325 The Mexican law prohibits
Mexican companies from furnishing any information to foreign authorities in
regard to their activities, and it allows for the institution of lawsuits to recover
("claw-back") any damages that were assessed against Mexican companies.326
Similarly, the Canadian statute places restrictions on the discovery process
and the giving of evidence by Canadian defendants. It provides for the
customary "claw-back" of any damages that were paid under Title IIn of
Helms-Burton, and it prohibits compliance with extraterritorial measures
imposed by the United States. 327 Under such circumstances, any relief that is
actually provided to U.S. citizens may be quite fleeting.
Finally, since national security is inherently linked to economic welfare,
any determination of net security gains or losses must include the impact of
trade-related actions on the domestic economy of the invoking nation. While
certainly dependent upon world opinion, trade restrictive conduct may lead to
imposition of retaliatory countermeasures by affected nations that can take a328
substantial toll on domestic industries. The protection of a vital industry, for
example, may ultimately lead to a decline in the health of other industrial
sectors.
This is not to imply that security-based activity is justified merely
because its economic benefits outweigh its economic costs. The security
exception was not designed to permit protectionism in the name of economic
welfare. What is being argued is that economic costs and benefits should be
considered (along with a variety of other factors) in determining whether a
particular security-based action would increase or decrease the overall
security interests of a nation. In those instances when security, as defined in
its totality, would be decreased by the imposition of restrictions or sanctions,
such options should be dismissed.
Given these considerations, the evaluation of economic effect will
always require a degree of delicacy. The fact that security-based restrictive
activity may benefit the domestic economy, and thus be a positive in terms of
both economic welfare and national security, does not in itself negate the
legitimacy of the action. On the other hand, the prospect of economic benefit
may taint the decision-making process and give rise to questions regarding
motive. Additionally, the assessment of adverse economic effects should be
325. Glossop, supra note 194, at 118; Kleinfeld & Wengel, supra note 130, at 404; Segall,
Export Controls, supra note 10, at 395.
326. Cata, supra note 194, at 529.
327. Glossop, supra note 194, at 97, 100-01, 108-15.
328. See, e.g., Restrictions on Imports of Dairy Products into the United States, GATT Doc.
CP.6/28/Add.1 (Sept. 24, 1951) at6, 11, 14-16.
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limited to the issue of whether the imposition of sanctions would decrease
overall national security; such an assessment should not form the basisfor the
imposition of a security-based measure. If restrictions are in fact necessary to
protect economic welfare, a nation must rely on other non-security related
provisions within the GATT Agreement which are accompanied by a variety
of procedural and substantive safeguards.
Nations would be wise to examine potential security-based activity
within this broader context while keeping the above caveat in mind. In the
area of export controls, for example, it has been argued that U.S. restrictions
have affected billions of dollars worth of exports in computers, software,
telecommunications equipment, and machine tools "without strengthening
security" and that licensing delays (which significantly impact profitability)
have been similarly incurred "without a meaningful addition to national
security., 329 From a broader perspective, it has been estimated that sanctions
cost U.S. companies fifteen to nineteen billion dollars in lost exports each year
and that those companies employ 200,000 fewer people in export-oriented
jobs.330 Retaliatory responses by both target and non-target countries may also
foreclose overseas markets to domestic producers and may adversely affect
growth and development, the availability of raw materials and skilled labor,
and the future competitive position of the economy.331 Long-term effects such
as these tend to drain governmental resources and may ultimately be
manifested in social and political division. Both the likelihood and the severity
of these consequences will be heightened when security-based restrictions or
sanctions are undertaken unilaterally without the consensus of the
international community.332 Thus, unilateral action will be less likely to
achieve its desired result and will also be more likely to invoke a substantially
broader-based retaliatory response.
C. The Need to Consider the Nature of the Threat
Exactly what constitutes a threat to essential security interests, and thus
what conduct justifies the use of security-based restrictions, are inherently
subjective considerations, for article XXI allows a nation to take "any action
which it considers necessary" to protect its security interests. 333 However,
threats to security can take a wide variety of forms and can differ substantially
in their degree of severity. As a result, it is both erroneous and unjust to
analyze the imposition of security-based sanctions in a one-size-fits-all
mentality.
In order to broaden the analytical framework for the evaluation of a
potential sanctions action, nations might consider initiating their decision-
making process by questioning whether the offending conduct actually
329. Gaugh, supra note 10, at 61-62 (citation omitted).
330. Joseph Kahn, Salvaging the Reputation ofSanctions, N.Y TIMEs, Oct. 15, 2000, at C4
(citing estimates from USA Engage).
331. For a recognition of the fact that factors such as the existence of raw materials, growth and
development, and skilled labor affect national security, see Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 232(d), 19
U.S.C. § 1862(d) (1994).
332. Schmitt, supra note 24.
333. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXI(b).
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endangers their national security or whether its effects are primarily limited to
the national security of another State. This is not to imply that a nation's
security is not dependent, at least in part, upon the security of its allies and
other friendly nations or that issues of morality have no place in international
relations.
What is being argued, however, is that unilateral security-based
sanctions should reflect the gravity of the security concern. In terms of degree,
it would seem logical that a threat directed at a third country would be
somewhat less onerous than a threat aimed directly at the invoking nation.
Additionally, such a sanction must be based upon an actual threat, or at least a
perceived threat, to a nation's essential security interests and thus should not
be automatically employed in support of another nation. For example, an
armed attack against the nation of Mexico would certainly threaten the
essential security interests of the United States. On the other hand, it is
somewhat more difficult to understand how the dispute between the United
Kingdom and Argentina concerning the Falkland Islands presented such a
substantial threat to the security of Canada and Australia that they felt
compelled to join in the sanctions against Argentina.334 In short, security-
based sanctions other than those imposed by the United Nations should not be
employed merely to create a group boycott among nations with similar
economic and political philosophies.
In addition to recognizing that a potential invoker may only be
tangentially affected by the target's conduct, nations must be willing to
examine potential threats to their essential security interests on a case by case
basis. Without such an examination, an appropriate response will not be
forthcoming. The criteria being presented in this Article are each dependent
upon an understanding of the actual nature of the threat being posed. Since
that nature will vary, nations cannot properly tailor their response unless they
are willing to analyze each instance of offensive conduct independently. A
draconian response to a limited threat, or for that matter a limited response to
a draconian threat, may indeed result in a substantial loss to the net security
interests of the invoking nation.
Threats to essential security interests may apparently range from a direct
nuclear attack to the protection of boot manufacturers and cheese producers.
335
Between these two extremes are potentially catastrophic threats, such as the
development or use of chemical, biological, or other weapons of mass
destruction. Associated with such threats are concerns regarding the dangers
of technology transfer, diversion, re-exportation, and the dual use of goods
and services. Other threats to national security include international terrorism,
systematic human rights violations, potential mass migration, the presence of
a nuclear power facility in a neighboring country and narcotics trafficking. In
each of these cases, of course, the dangers being posed may be further
334. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 7, 1982, GATT Doc. CM1157, at 2, 5, 6
(June 22, 1982).
335. E.g., Sweden-Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear, GATT Doc. L/4250 (Nov. 17,




enhanced by geographical proximity, by rogue nation status, or by irrational
leadership.
These threats can pose differing degrees of danger to an invoking nation.
The use of biological weapons, for example, should provoke a substantially
greater response than should the re-exportation of goods that are already
abundantly available from other international producers. In light of the
substantial collateral damage that can be caused by an over-response, nations
should be willing both to consider the actual degree of offensive conduct and
to weigh the realistic security gains or losses that would result from a
particular responsive action.
d. Threats to International Peace and the Need for
Humanitarian Considerations
Throughout the decision-making process, nations must also recognize
that the imposition of sanctions may decrease net national security by way of
endangering the international peace. Article 2 of the U.N. Charter not only
requires members to settle their disputes peacefully, it requires that disputes
be settled in a manner "that international peace and security, and justice, are
not endangered. ' '336 In this regard, it must be acknowledged that all sanctions
are inherently designed to impose social, political, and economic hardship on
the target. Not only may coercive sanctions provoke hostility and retaliation,
they may pose a threat to the peace by jeopardizing the conditions of stability
and well-being that are necessary to maintain that peace. Article 55 of the
Charter recognizes that such stability is in fact dependent upon such factors as
increased standards of living, higher employment, economic and social
progress, and better education and health care. 33 7 Unfortunately, it is precisely
such conditions that are intentionally undermined by the imposition of a
security-based sanction.
In addressing a similar issue, Clinton Cameron has noted that whether
economic sanctions will endanger international peace and security depends
upon the quantity and degree of economic hardship being suffered by the
target as a result of the imposition. The greater the hardship, the more likely
the sanctions will result in retaliation and an endangering of the peace. When
a powerful nation, or a group of nations acting collectively, denies access to a
product or to a market that is essential to the well-being of the target State, the
risk to international peace will be substantially increased.339
Some security-based sanctions are imposed for humanitarian purposes
and are designed to force nations to alter abhorrent policies. The actions taken
against such States as Iraq and Cuba were aimed, at least in part, at reversing
the tide of oppression and the systematic denial of human rights being
experienced in those countries. Additionally, sanctions often provide
exceptions for humanitarian purposes allowing the provision of medicine and
336. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
337. Id., art. 55.
338. Cameron, supra note 10, at 251.
339. Id. at 251-52.
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medical supplies and the donation of food, clothing, and educational materials
necessary to meet basic human needs or to relieve human suffering.340
Nevertheless, economic sanctions, including those imposed for security
purposes, generally hurt people more than governments. As a human rights
observer in Haiti noted, the military command and wealthy elite "were waxing
rich off the contraband industry the economic sanctions had spawned" while
the rest of the population was literally "starving to death. 341 Unfortunately,
such a scenario is quite common. The effects of foreclosing consumer
markets, denying economic aid, withholding essential goods and services,
342
and blacklisting the identity of a nation are primarily borne by those who are
most in need. Additionally, the hardships experienced by a blameless
population will not be limited to the period in which the sanction is imposed.
It may take years to reconstruct not only the physical and economic
infrastructure of the nation, but its social fabric as well.343
As a result, some believe that humanitarian considerations should not
only play a role in the decision-making process, but that they should be a
significant factor in determining the actual lawfulness of a sanction.344 In a
similar vein, Reisman argues that the use of highly coercive economic
sanctions, like other strategic instruments of high coercion, "must be based on
lawful contingencies." 345 In this context, he asserts that such sanctions must
be more precisely designed in light of their ability to discriminate between the
military/political elite and the general population and that different options
must be compared in an attempt to minimize collateral damage to the extent
possible.346 Additionally, the amount of collateral damage to be allowed
would depend upon such factors as the degree of injury threatened by the
target's conduct, the irreparability of that injury should it occur, and whether
the target's population has no meaningful say in the decision giving rise to the
offensive conduct. 347 Since security-based economic sanctions are generally
highly coercive in nature, similar considerations should apply.
340. See, e.g., Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (Helms-Burton Act)
§109(a)(2), 22 U.S.C. §§ 6039(a)(2) (1997); 22 U.S.C. 6041(b)(2)(A); Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of
1996 § 5(f)(7), 50 U.S.C. 1701 (Supp. IV 1998); Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 § 586G(a)(8), 50 U.S.C. §
1701 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); International Emergency Powers Act § 203(b)(2), 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(2)
(1994); Export Administration Act of 1979 § 6(g), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(g) (1994). In regard to the use
of sanctions and other economic mechanisms to promote compliance with human rights, see Cleveland,
supra note 10. In particular regard to U.S. actions, see id. at 31-48.
341. Panel, The Costs and Benefits, supra note 10, at 350-51 (remarks by W. Michael
Reisman). See also Joyner, supra note 10, at 269 ("UN sanctions might impact more severely on the
civilian population of a target State than the offending government, as, for example, in the protracted
case of Iraq.'); id. at 270 ("[C]ost [often] falls most heavily on the civilian population of the State, rather
than on the recalcitrant government itself').
342. Panel, The Costs and Benefits, supra note 10, at 339-40 (remarks by Laurence Boisson de
Chazoumes) (restricting commercial transactions, interrupting economic assistance, and the importance
of energy and telecommunication services).
343. Panel, The Costs and Benefits, supra note 10, at 351, 359 (remarks by NV. Michael
Reisman).
344. Panel, The Costs and Benefits, supra note 10, at 338-40 (remarks by Laurence de Boisson
de Chazournes).
345. Panel, The Costs and Benefits, supra note 10, at 355 (remarks by W. Michael Reisman).
346. Id. at 356-59.
347. Id. at 356, 357-58.
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The elevation of humanitarian considerations from a moral conception to
a moral and legal conception would encourage nations to more fully weigh the
consequences of sanctioning activity. More significantly, however, if such
considerations are indeed a "legal conception," then they should be subject to
judicial scrutiny.348 All rights and all duties that find their basis in the law
must in fact be capable of being evaluated by the law.349 As a result, the
introduction of such a legal assessment into the process of imposing security-
based sanctions could provide an initial foundation for the accountability of
nations.
IV. SEARCHING FOR JURISDICTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
A. The Willingness to Examine Security Issues
The powerful will always be reluctant to yield their power, and, as such,
the strongest of nations have been unified in their belief that matters of
security are overwhelmingly political in nature and therefore non-justiciable.
On the other hand, the right to protect essential security interests is not
unlimited since it must be exercised in the context of other international legal
principles and in the context of international agreements that have been
voluntarily undertaken. 350 For example, if a nation claims that its national
security requires the employment of genocide, two fundamental tenets of
international law would be brought into substantial conflict, namely, the
35135
respect for national sovereignty and the prohibition against genocide.352
One would sincerely hope that the international community would not accept
the security rationale under such a circumstance. While such an example
represents the extreme, it also reflects the fact that the argument of non-
reviewability will give way to universal condemnation.
Similarly, nations often choose to actually surrender a degree of
sovereignty through international cooperation in order to obtain some form of
mutual advantage. The language of article XXI, for example, would seem to
represent such a concession and, therefore, invite a degree of external
scrutiny. Article XXI does not merely speak in terms of "security interests,"
348. For a discussion regarding the relationship between a "legal conception" and "legal
appreciation" or "evaluation by the law," see Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 286 (June 27) (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (quoting HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNcTION OF
LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 179-80 (1933)).
349. Id.
350. Nicaragua has argued, for example, that article XXI of the General Agreement must be
interpreted in light of international law and the decisions of the United Nations and the International
Court of Justice. Unpublished Panel Report on United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua,
1986 WL 363154, L/6053, 4.5, 5.2, 5.15 (Oct. 13, 1986) (unadopted). See also Hahn, supra note 10,
at 579 (noting that article XXI is "part of a legal text" and "exceptions to legal texts must be interpreted
narrowly"), at 589 ("the drafters did see legal limits to the use of the security exception"), at 584
(XXI(b) has "objective prerequisites considerably limiting its scope"), and at 592, n.149 ("[A] correct
understanding of GATT allows Panels to review article XXI actions in substance, albeit according to the
remarkably loose standard prescribed by article XXI."). For a more detailed discussion of Hahn's
position, and the limitations placed upon review, see supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
351. U.N. CHARTER art. 2.
352. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
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but in terms of essential security interests. It does not allow security-based
measures to be taken "at any time," but rather during times of "war or other
emergenc[ies] in international relations."353 Since exceptions to the basic
principles of the GATT should be strictly construed, some credence must be
given to such restrictive language.354 If exceptions for foreign policy and
national security concerns are so beyond the scope of the GATT, and so
universally ingrained in customary international law, there would have been
no need for even including article XXI within the General Agreement.
Whether the article XXI exception is self-defining, however, is in fact
irrelevant to a variety of more fundamental issues surrounding the
reviewability of security-based actions. For example, even if it is assumed that
such an exception is self-defining, a position that has never been adopted by
the Contracting Parties,355 such a fact would not be based upon the
requirements of customary international law. Instead, it would merely reflect
the fact that nations, whether consciously or not and whether reluctantly or
not, have agreed to permit such discretion as part of the broad negotiating
process that led to the creation of the GATT. As a result, the reviewability of
security measures is not necessarily foreclosed by customary law nor would
the issue of reviewability be precluded from consideration in other agreements
such as treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation. Further, setting
article XXI aside for a moment, the fact that security issues may be non-
justiciable does not in itself foreclose review of what actually constitutes a
security issue. In other words, before a dispute can be determined to be non-
justiciable, the true nature of that dispute must be identified. Mere allegations
should not be equated with fact. Actions may be reviewable for the purpose of
determining if they are based upon security concerns and therefore beyond
external scrutiny.
356
The resolution of these issues will ultimately depend upon the
willingness of a judicial or quasi-judicial body to exercise jurisdiction in their
regard. In Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua,
357
the International Court of Justice clearly indicated that it would be willing to
accept such a role. At least under the circumstances presented in that case, the
Court was adamant in its belief that essential security interests, and the actions
taken in their regard, were neither above the law nor free from judicial
scrutiny.
After noting that "the Court has jurisdiction to determine any dispute as
to its own jurisdiction," and that its judgment in that regard would be both
final and binding upon the parties,358 the Court held that it clearly had
jurisdiction to determine whether the measures taken by the United States
353. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXI(b)(iii).
354. Hahn, supra note 10, at 579 ("[a]xceptions to legal texts must be interpreted narrowly.");
id. at 590-91 (discussing "emergency in international relations"); Laing, supra note 10, at 336
(discussing "essential" security interests).
355. The issue regarding whether the article XXI exception is self-defining has never been
answered by the Contracting Parties. Unpublished Panel Report on United States-Trade Measures
Affecting Nicaragua, 1986 WL 363154, L/6053, 5.3, 5.17 (Oct. 13, 1986) (unadopted).
356. Hahn, supra note 10, at 611-12; see also supra note 77 and accompanying text.
357. 1986 I.C.J.14 (June 27).
358. Id. at 24.
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were "justifiable" under the security exception contained in the Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. 9 Certainly the fact tlat the Treaty of
Friendship employed the "necessary" rather than the "it considers necessary"
language of article XXI of the GATT played a substantial role in the Court's
analysis.360 Of critical importance, however, is the fact that in the absence of
the "it considers" language, the Court was free (and quite willing) to
determine which measures were necessary to protect essential security
interests and which measures were not. After indicating that security-based
actions must be more than merely "useful,"3 61 the Court held that the
sanctions imposed by way of the trade embargo were indeed unnecessary to
protect the essential security interests of the United States. 362 In light of such a
holding, it would appear that at least some of the restrictions limiting the
review of security issues are not in fact required by customary law, but are
instead self-imposed by nations through international agreement. As reiterated
in the Oil Platform case, a security exception that does not impose the "it
considers" restriction would simply be viewed as a potential, and reviewable,
363defense on the merits.
The Nicaragua case also presents an interesting analogy in its rejection
of the alleged justification of "collective self-defense. ' '364 While dissenting on
other grounds, Judge Schwebel addressed this issue in detail and indicated that
he could not subscribe to any contention that the use of force in self-defense
was "a 'political' and hence non-justiciable question. 3 65 While the U.N.
Charter recognizes the inherent right of both individual and collective self-
defense, such a recognition could not be interpreted to mean that only the
nation exercising that right would have the power to judge the legality of its
actions. Instead, the U.N. Security Council would clearly be entitled "to
adjudge the legality of a State's resort to self-defense and to decide whether
such recourse is legitimate."
366
Schwebel relied extensively on Lauterpacht's treatise The Functioning
of Law in the International Community.367 In that work, Lauterpacht observed
that while recourse to self-defense is not in itself illegal, "it is the business of
the Courts to determine whether, how far, and for how long there was a
necessity to have recourse to it."3 68 Like any other dispute of substantial
importance, recourse to self-defense is "capable of judicial decision, and it is
only the determination of States not to have questions of this nature decided
by a foreign tribunal which may make it non-justiciable." 369
The use of force in self-defense is an action designed to protect national
security or, in the language of article XXI, "essential security interests." In
359. Id. at 116, 136.
360. Id. at 115-16.
361. Id. at 117, 141.
362. Id. at 141-42.
363. 1996 I.C.J. 811 (Dec. 12).
364. The Court rejected the justification of collective self-defense by a vote of twelve to three.
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 146 (June 27).
365. Id. at 284 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
366. Id. at 285.
367. See supra note 348.
368. 19S6 I.C.J. 14,286 (June 27) (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
369. Id.
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light of the discussion above, it would appear that such an action would not be
self-defining, but would instead be evaluated under the law by both the
International Court of Justice and the U.N. Security Council. Under such a
circumstance, it would seem somewhat ironic that economic sanctions, being
similarly designed to protect essential security interests, would be free from
all evaluation. While sanctions do not constitute forcible measures as
conventionally understood, their impact can be substantially greater. To so
thoroughly distinguish between two responses, one economic and one
military, both of which are aimed at protecting identical interests and
imposing substantial damage, would seem to be contradictory.
In regard to the United Nations Security Council, several arguments may
be advanced in support of its jurisdiction over questions involving the
lawfulness of security-based activity. For example, article 34 of the Charter
authorizes the Security Council to investigate "any dispute" or "any situation"
that "might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to
determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.' 370 Certainly,
the unilateral imposition of security-based sanctions could be categorized as a
"situation" that might lead to "international friction." As a result, the Security
Council would have the power to examine at least the issue of whether the
imposition of sanctions would pose such a risk. If it is indeed found that the
continuance of such a situation would be likely to endanger the maintenance
of international peace, it is logical to conclude that the dispute would fall
under the provisions of article 33. In such circumstances, a dispute not settled
by the parties must be referred to the Security Council pursuant to article 37.
The Council may then decide whether to recommend appropriate terms of
settlement under article 37 or to recommend "appropriate procedures or
methods of adjustment" pursuant to article 36.371
Several other Charter provisions could also serve as the basis for
Security Council jurisdiction over unilaterally imposed security-based
sanctions. As has been noted,372 severe economic sanctions, often imposing
substantially greater hardship than armed attack, inherently undermine the
conditions for peace outlined under article 55.373 As a result, such sanctions
may represent a form of dispute settlement that endangers international peace
in violation of article 2.3.374 In addition, sanctions of this kind may pose a
"threat to the peace" under article 39.375 In terms of the latter, the Security
Council has been given the authority to determine the existence of any threat
to the peace and therefore to define which conduct actually constitutes a threat
to the peace, and to take both economic and military measures in fashioning a
376
response.
370. U.N. CHARTER art. 34 (emphasis added). See also id., art. 35 ("[A]ny Member of the
United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the
attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly.").
371. Id., art. 36, para. 1; id. art. 37, para. 2.
372. See supra notes 142-157, and 336-337 and accompanying text.
373. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
374. Id., art. 2., para. 3.
375. Id., art. 39.
376. M., arts. 39, 41,42.
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In recognizing the interplay between the Security Council and the
International Court of Justice, article 36.3 provides that in making
recommendations regarding disputes that may endanger international peace,
the Security Council "should also take into consideration that legal disputes
should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of
Justice."377 The mere presence of a "legal element" in a dispute that is
overwhelmingly political in character, however, does not transform that
dispute into one of a justiciable nature.378 As Judge Oda noted, the phrase "as
a general rule" serves to underscore the fact that the existence of such an
element should not necessarily attract the application of the provision.
379
On the other hand, it can also be argued that international agreements
such as the GATT, the U.N. Charter, and Treaties of Friendship all represent
attempts to "de-politicize" the relationships among nations. They are legal
instruments that establish a series of rights and obligations based upon mutual
advantage, mutual concession, and reasonable expectations. 380 Under such a
circumstance, an international body should be empowered to review whether a
nation's actions adhere to the terms and the spirit of those agreements. Such
an argument should not be interpreted as denying nations the right to protect
their essential security interests. Instead, it simply represents a mandate that
nations exercise their rights within the confines of international contracts
voluntarily undertaken.
Finally, a proposal to increase the involvement of other international
institutions in security-based disputes would build upon the "institutional
comity" approach urged by Antonio F. Perez. 381 Recognizing the current
disconnect between the United Nations and the World Trade Organization
regarding security issues,382 Perez believes that we must "reconceive the
relationships between ... supranational organizations" and view the World
Trade Organization "as a member of the family of 'sovereign' supranational
institutions... ,383 Employing choice of law principles, Perez argues that the
World Trade Organization should look to the practices of the United Nations
to ascertain the circumstances under which States can legitimately invoke the
security exception and, in particular, "to whether the Security Council has
ever found a similar situation to warrant international enforcement action."
384
Such an approach would incorporate the activity of the Security Council into
the work of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body385 and would require the
World Trade Organization, when necessary, "to subordinate its policies and
interests to those of coordinate institutions" and to grant deference to the law
377. Id., art. 36, para. 3. Article 36, paragraph 1 refers to "a dispute of the nature referred to in
Article 33 or of a situation of like nature." Article 33, in turn, refers to any dispute "the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."
378. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 239 (June 27)
(Oda, J. dissenting).
379. Id.
380. In regard to the concept of reasonable expectations, see supra note 312 and accompanying
text.
381. Perez, supra note 10.
382. Id. at 302.
383. Id. at 381.
384. Id. at 306.
385. Id. at 375.
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386
of the United Nations. By looking to Security Council practices regarding
what constitutes both threats to international peace and security and objective
measures of good faith, the institutional comity approach could eliminate the
self-judging character of the security exception.387
B. Searching for Accountability
This Article has proposed a variety of factors to be considered when
contemplating the use of security-based measures. It has argued that nations
should weigh their essential security interests against potential disruptions to
the multilateral trading system. It has urged nations to respect the rights of
sovereignty and non-intervention and to take action only in light of the
concepts of necessity, exhaustion, and least restrictive alternatives. It has
asserted the relevance of the target's stage of development, the effect on non-
target nations, the need for consistency in application, and the likelihood of
success. Finally, this Article has suggested that nations engage in a
cost/benefit analysis, encompassing such additional variables as the actual
nature of the threat being posed and the response of third party nations, in
order to more accurately depict the net security gains and losses that would
result from a particular action.
As a minimum, this Article has proposed that nations employ these
considerations as self-imposed guidelines in their decision-making process.
By doing so, potential invokers would be permitted to make a more realistic, a
more broadly based, and a more intelligent decision regarding competing
options. Additionally, such an analysis would tend to curtail activity based
upon immediate political expediency and would help to reverse the tendency
to err on the side of imposition.
The nature of essential security interests, however, has changed. In light
of increasing political and economic interdependence, and in light of
escalating technological advancement, a threat to security is rarely limited to
the interests of a single nation. Whether the result of the evolving character of
security concerns or of the fact that industrialized nations are acting on behalf
of their less-developed neighbors, threats to essential security interests tend to
be substantially more global in their impact and in the response they may
invoke. The security concerns of most industrialized nations, for example, do
not revolve around the likelihood of an armed invasion at their borders.
Instead, their concerns are directed at the development of chemical and
biological weapons by rogue nations, at the existence of international
terrorism, and at the widespread abuse of fundamental human rights. These
concerns, however, are similarly shared by almost all members of the global
community, indicating that such activities endanger the future well-being of
all nations. As a result, a focus on national security, rather than on global
security, would seem to be somewhat misplaced, and a proposal that suggests
a more multilateral approach to security issues would appear to be justified.
386. Id. at 358.
387. Id. at 372-75.
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Additionally, by suggesting an increase in the level of multilateral
participation in security-based disputes, and by encouraging potential invokers
to engage in a detailed decision-making process, the proposal presented here
may aid in the internalization of global norms. In his seminal article on why
nations obey international law, Harold Koh described a "transnational legal
process" of interaction, interpretation, and internalization through which an
international norm penetrates a nation's domestic legal system, becomes part
of that nation's "internal value set," and reshapes the national interest and
identity of that nation.388 Repeated interactions between transnational actors,
Koh argues, forces interpretation or enunciation of global norms, and, when
internalized through legislative, judicial, or executive acceptance, generates
legal rules that will guide future interactions. 389 By provoking a dialogue
regarding the need for both external review and more effective remedies for
target nations, and by laying out a variety of considerations to be employed by
nations as internal or self-imposed guidelines, this proposal attempts to spur
such a process.
1. The Ineffectiveness of the GA TT System
The use of a multilateral approach to security issues has been
conspicuously absent over the life of the GATT. Disputes involving security-
based activities have historically been resolved through the use of power-
based relations rather than through consensus or a recognition of mutual
advantage. The realities of this dispute settlement system are particularly
disappointing since the procedural framework necessary for multilateral
participation is already in place.
It is generally believed that the use of the security exception under
article XXI is not free from the "nullification or impairment" provisions of
article XXI. 3 9 0 During the 1947 discussion in Geneva it was stated that a
388. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2602-03, 2641, 2645-58 (1997).
389. Id. at 2646.
390. Article XXIII of GATT provides:
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly
under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of
the Agreement is being impeded as the result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this
Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts
with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation,
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written
representations or proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to be
concerned. Any contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the
representations or proposals made to it.
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties concerned within a
reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type described in paragraph 1 (c) of this Article, the
matter may be referred to the Contracting Parties. The Contracting Parties shall promptly
investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make appropriate recommendations to the
contracting parties which they consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as
appropriate. The Contracting Parties may consult with contracting parties, with the Economic
and Social Council of the United Nations and with any appropriate inter-governmental
organization in cases where they consider such consultation necessary. If the Contracting Parties
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contracting party affected by the exercise of article XXI "would have the right
to seek redress of some kind" under article XXIII since "there is no exception
from the application" of article XXIII "to this or any other Article."391 The
addition of a note to clarify the fact that the provisions of article XXIII were
applicable to article XXI "was rejected as unnecessary." 392 Similarly, in the
Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement,393 the
Contracting Parties decided that "when action is taken under Article XXI, all
contracting parties affected by such action retain their full rights under the
General Agreement."
394
In practice, the applicability of article XXIII to article XXI has been
raised on a variety of occasions. In United States-Trade Measures Affecting
Nicaragua,395 for example, the government of Nicaragua argued that it had
been recognized by both the drafters of the General Agreement and by the
Contracting Parties "that an invocation of Article XXI did not prevent
recourse to Article XXE[[., 39 6 In recognizing such a fact, the GATT Panel
carried out its examination of the U.S. embargo as a non-violation case under
article XXIII, paragraph l(b). While no remedy was forthcoming, the Panel
did in fact consider "the question of whether the nullification or impairment of
the trade opportunities of Nicaragua through the embargo constituted a
nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to Nicaragua within the
meaning of Article XXIII:I(b). ' 397 Similarly, in both the Yugoslavia and
Argentina cases, a number of contracting parties took the position that the
provisions of article XXI were indeed subject to those of article XXIII. 398
Even the United States has admitted that "Article XXIII rights were not
necessarily lost in all cases in which Article XXI was invoked"399 and that the
use of article XXI "did not prevent recourse to the procedure of Article
XXIII."
400
consider that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a
contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of
such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate
in the circumstances. If the application to any contracting party of any concession or other
obligation is in fact suspended, that contracting party shall then be free, not later than sixty days
after such action is taken, to give written notice to the Executive Secretary to the Contracting
Parties of its intention to withdraw from this Agreement and such withdrawal shall take effect
upon the sixtieth day following the day on which such notice is received by him.
391. GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 10, at 606.
392. Id.
393. Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement, Nov. 30, 1982, GATT
B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 23 (1983).
394. Id. at 24.
395. Unpublished Panel Report on United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, 1986
WL 363154, L/6053 (Oct. 13, 1986) (unadopted).
396. Id. 4.8.
397. Id. % 5.6.
398. GATT Council, EEC-Trade Measures Taken for Non-Economic Reasons, GATT Doc.
DS27/2, at 2 (Feb. 10, 1992); Council of Representatives, Report on Work since the Thirty-Seventh
Session, GATT Doc. L/5414, at 20 (Nov. 12, 1982); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on June
29-30, 1982, GATT Doc. C/M/159, at 14-16 (Aug. 10, 1982); GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held
on May 7, 1982, GATT Doc. C/M1157, at 9 (June 22, 1982).
399. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on July 17-19, 1985, GATT Doc. C/M1191, at
41 (Sep. 11, 1985).
400. Unpublished Panel Report on United States--Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, 1986
WL 363154, L/6053, 4.9 (Oct. 13, 1986) (unadopted). In regard to scholarly opinion, see JACKSON,
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Article XXIII contemplates the use of both "violation" and "non-
violation" complaints. A violation complaint involves an allegation that the
party complained against has engaged in activity that is in fact inconsistent
with the terms of the GATT. Such a complaint provides a number of
advantages to the complaining party. First, if a violation of the agreement has
occurred, a nullification or impairment of the benefits accruing to the
complaining party will be presumed. Such a prima facie case of nullification
or impairment relieves the complaining party of the burden of demonstrating
injury and shifts the burden of proof to the defending party to show that such a401
nullification or impairment has not occurred. Second, if a violation of the
agreement has occurred and evidence rebutting a nullification or impairment
is lacking, the panel is aP0arently bound to recommend the actual withdrawal
of the offending measure.
Non-violation complaints are brought pursuant to paragraph l(b) of
article XXII. 4 03 This paragraph allows recourse to article XXIII if a
nullification or impairment results from a measure taken by another party
"whether or not" such a measure conflicts with the provisions of the
Agreement.404 As a result, this provision recognizes that even lawful measures
consistent with the GATT may nevertheless nullify or impair the benefits
accruing to another member.405 When a violation of the agreement is not
being alleged, however, the existence of nullification or impairment is linked
to the issue of "reasonable expectations 'A 6 and to activity "that could not
reasonably have been anticipated at the time when the ... concessions were
negotiated., 40 7  As Hoekman and Mavroidis have noted, reasonable
expectations are created by way of concessions that are negotiated at any
given point in time and contracting parties can reasonably expect that the
balance of these concessions will not be later nullified or impaired.40  As a
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 3, at 748 ("The only adequate recourse for a party
damaged by another's 'security' action is to utilize the complaint procedures, such as Article XXIII,
'nullification and impairment."); Hahn, supra note 10, at 592 ("Article XXImI applies to actions under
article XX.") and 611 ("Article XXIII does not contain a prescription or command of non-application to
'political' disputes .... It seems to have been clear to all participants that article XXI would not be
exempted from review by the Contracting Parties."). See also Gaugh, supra note 10, at 69; Knoll, supra
note 10, at 601; Wilch, supra note 10, at 182, n.200.
401. Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance,
Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 216 (1980). See also United States-Restrictions on
Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS29/R (June 16, 1994) 3.87; JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW
OF GATT, supra note 3, at 182 (stating that a prima facie nullification or impairment requires "counter
evidence from the offending party to establish that no nullification and impairment has occurred.").
402. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 3, at 182.
403. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIII, para. l(b).
404. Id. See also Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 216 (1980).
405. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 3, at 181-82 (stating
that a violation of GATT is "not a necessary condition for invocation of Article XXIII'); Hahn, supra
note 10, at 610-11 ("Illegality of the pertinent action leading to nullification and impairment is not a
necessary prerequisite for the specific redress granted by article XXIII.').
406. See GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on Nov. 5, 1986, GATT Doc. C/M1204, at 9
(Nov. 19, 1986).
407. Unpublished Panel Report on United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, 1986
WL 363154, U6053, 4.8 (Oct. 13, 1986) (unadopted).
408. Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra note 255, at 22-25.
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result, governmental actions that offset or modify these agreed-upon
concessions can give rise to a non-violation complaint.
409
lhe use of a non-violation complaint, however, is subject to two distinct
disadvantages. First, the burden of proving a nullification or impairment is
placed squarely upon the complaining party who, pursuant to the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, must present "a detailed justification in support of any
complaint., 410 As a result, the benefits of a prima facie action are lost.
Second, while a panel or the Appellate Body may recommend that a party
"make a mutually satisfactory adjustment," the defending party has absolutely
no obligation to withdraw the measure even if benefits are being nullified or
impaired.411
Unfortunately, when severe economic sanctions are imposed by a
powerful nation against a weak one, recourse to article XXIII is meaningless.
Under current GATT practice, or more directly pursuant to the mandate of
industrialized nations, the exercise of article XXI is self-defining. As a result,
a nation exercising its discretion under that article cannot, by definition, be in
violation of the GATT. On the other hand, if the existence of a nullification or
impairment is established by way of a non-violation proceeding, the panel
would lack authority to order the removal of the sanction. Similarly, if the
panel chose to recommend that the sanctioning nation compensate the target
for the nullification or impairment, such compensation would not, to say the
least, be forthcoming. Finally, if the panel chose to authorize the target to
suspend its concessions and obligations toward the sanctioning nation, this
would achieve little, for the sanctioning nation will- likely have already
severed all trading relationships with the target.
The impotency of article XXIII was nowhere more apparent than in the412
Nicaragua case. Crippled by the terms of reference and the inability to
examine either motivation or justification, the panel was forced to treat the
allegations as a non-violation complaint. Since the panel had no authority to
require a removal of the embargo, and since the United States had previously
indicated that it would not agree to such a removal, the panel refrained from
making a meaningless recommendation in that regard.413 Similarly, since the
United States had already imposed a two-way embargo against Nicaragua, any
authorization permitting Nicaragua to suspend the application of concessions
toward the United States would also be meaningless. 14 As a result, the panel
"had to conclude" that even if the embargo nullified or impaired benefits
accruing to Nicaragua, the Contracting Parties could "take no decision under
Article XXIII, paragraph 2 that would re-establish the balance of advantages"
409. Id. See also Hahn, supra note 10, at 611 ("Under GATT caselaw, a complaint will
eventually be successful if the 'damaged' party could reasonably expect the other Contracting Party not
to take the damaging measure.").
410. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 26,
para. l(a), supra note 17, at 374.
411. Id., art. 26, para. 1(b).
412. Unpublished Panel Report on United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, 1986





under the agreement.4t5 In short, the only decision that was actually handed
down by the Panel was that it could provide no solutions to Nicaragua's
problem.
2. Broadening the Remedial Base
Fourteen years have passed since the panel issued its non-opinion in the
Nicaragua case. Since then, the Contracting Parties completed the Uruguay
Round of Negotiations, creating the World Trade Organization and
substantially strengthening the Dispute Settlement Body. Nevertheless, the
fundamental questions left open in Nicaragua-whether article XXI is in fact
self-defining and whether adequate redress is available to affected parties
under article XXIII-have remained completely unanswered.41 6
Such a circumstance can lead to only one conclusion. If less-developed
nations are to have a say in this new international framework, and if they are
to be free to make lawful decisions without external interference, substantial
changes must be made to existing policy. In terms of the GATT, these
changes may be implemented by either allowing WTO panels to determine
whether a nation has "violated" article XXI or by expanding the remedies
available in "non-violation" cases.
Suggesting a multilateral approach to the resolution of security disputes
can no longer be dismissed as overly dramatic. As already reflected in the
U.N. Charter, the GATT must recognize the fact that even "inherent rights"
are not without limitation.417 These rights, while primarily within the
discretion of a sovereign, may indeed give way to a greater need for inclusion.
Additionally, when the element of economic and political power is introduced,
the exercise of inherent rights may substantially conflict with the principle of
"sovereign equality., 418 As a result, to allow intimidation or abuse through the
arbitrary use of power, based upon a misguided conception of natural right, is
simply unacceptable.419
415. Id. See also GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on Nov. 5, 1986, GATT Doe.
CM204, at 8-9 (Nov. 19, 1986).
416. Unpublished Panel Report on United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, 1986
WL 363154, L/6053, 5.11 (Oct. 13, 1986) (unadopted) ("[The] Panel decided not to propose a ruling in
this case on the basic question of whether actions under article XXI could nullify or impair GATT
benefits of the adversely affected contracting party."); id., 5.17:
[I]f it were accepted that the interpretation of Article XXI was reserved entirely to the
contracting party invoking it, how could the Contracting Parties ensure that this general
exception to all obligations under the General Agreement is not invoked excessively or for
purposes other than those set out in this provision? If the Contracting Parties give a panel the
task of examining a case involving an Article XXI invocation without authorizing it to examine
the justification of that invocation, do they limit the adversely affected contracting party's right
to have its complaint investigated in accordance with Article XXIII:2? Are the powers of the
Contracting Parties under Article XXIII:2 sufficient to provide redress to contracting parties
subjected to a two-way embargo?
417. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security.") (emphasis added).
418. Id., art. 2, para. 1 ("The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of
all its Members.").
419. In discussing the potential abuse of economic power, Jackson has indicated that "[F]or this
reason it might be wise to try to put Article XXI invocations on a more multilateral basis." JACKSON,
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With regard to the first of these options, there are a variety of reasons
why a target nation would welcome the opportunity to institute a "violation"
complaint. As noted earlier, the remedies of suspending concessions or
imposing retaliatory measures are often without meaning. On the other hand,
if an actual violation is found, nullification or impairment will be presumed,
the burden of proof will be shifted to the invoking nation, and a withdrawal of
the measure will be recommended. Additionally, a finding that the imposition
of a sanction was in fact inconsistent with a nation's obligations under the
GATT would tend to muster international opinion in opposition to such a
measure.
In order to find a violation, a WTO panel must be empowered either to
examine the specific prerequisites found within article XXI or to examine
more broadly the actual nature and definition of a security interest. As such,
the amount of authority that could be delegated to a WTO panel could vary
considerably in degree.
In addressing this issue of degree, it can be argued that article XXI
already contemplates the use of violation complaints. If a violation of this
article was meant to be inherently impossible, there would have been no need
to list the particular circumstances under which it could be applied or to
include the qualifying concepts of "essential" security interests or
"emergencies in international relations." As Hahn has argued, these objective
prerequisites place legal limits on the scope and use of the security exception
and serve to underscore the fact that article XXI is not exempt from all
review.420 An invoking State has the duty to show that these prerequisites
have been met and to "supply sufficient facts to exclude improper motivation.
.. ,421 As a result, the invoking State would have to demonstrate that it was
acting to protect its essential security interests, and if it chose not to
participate in the proceedings, it "would have to bear the disadvantage arising
out of such omission and lose its protection provided by Article XXI. '' 422 On
the other hand, Hahn also recognizes substantial restrictions on the scope of
review 423 and argues that if the prerequisites of article XXI are met, the article
does not further restrict the rights of parties to apply economic measures for
political purposes.424 Additionally, if a party has acted lawfully under the
provisions of article XXI, the panel could not continue its examination under
the provisions of article XXIII since there is no room for the reasonable
expectations approach when article XXI is involved.425
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 3, at 752. Although wide leeway would be given to
countries invoking this article, perhaps they should be "subject to review by a GATT Working Party,
which may report on its views." Id.
420. Hahn, supra note 10, at 584, 589-91, 611. See also supra notes 71-77 and accompanying
text and supra notes 350, 354, 400.
421. Hahn, supra note 10, at 605.
422. Id. at 616. Hahn also makes the suggestion that a State acting under article XXI(b)(iii)
give notification to affected parties and that such a notification should substantiate the fact that the State
is acting for security purposes. Id. at 618-19. He also makes note of the fact that "[ifn a matter in which
Article XXI turns out to be relevant, the Contracting Parties should make clear that it is up to the party
acting under that provision to show initially that it has not abused its right." Id. at 620.
423. See supra note 77.
424. Hahn, supra note 10, at 584.
425. Id. at 616-17.
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A search for greater accountability, however, does not have to be limited
to the current scope of article XXI, nor must it be limited by prevailing
notions of national sovereignty. Instead, the inevitability of increasing global
interdependence requires that the conceptual boundaries of these traditional
theories be tested. We cannot allow current perceptions of self-interest or
present realities to frustrate a vision for more multilateral participation.
Therefore, this Article argues that WTO panels should be granted a
greater degree of authority both in terms of the scope of their review and the
remedies they may provide. In regard to the former, a panel could be
empowered to examine the fundamental question of whether an action reflects
a bona fide security concern as measured in terms of some of the
considerations that have been outlined throughout this Article. For example, a
panel could examine an action in light of the demands of necessity,
exhaustion, and the availability of a less restrictive alternative. They could
examine issues regarding consistency of application, the likelihood of success,
and the response of third parties. Even the concept of net security gains or
losses accruing to the invoking nation could be examined since a finding of
net loss would shed light on the elusive issues of motivation and justification.
These considerations would be applied in an attempt to distinguish
between measures designed to protect essential security interests and those
designed for purposes of economic, political, or cultural manipulation. When
it would be extremely unlikely that the action would achieve its stated
purpose, for example, or when the net security of the invoking nation would in
fact be diminished, it would be difficult to view the measure as being either
necessary or essential. By applying these considerations, mere claims of
essential security interests would no longer be equated with a bona fide
exercise of the security exception. Instead, the burden of proving justification
would be on the party seeking to be released from its GATT obligations.
Similarly, if an even greater degree of authority were to be granted, a panel
fashioning an appropriate remedy could also consider such factors as the
target's stage of development, the effect of the measure on non-target nations,
and the potential disruption to the multilateral trading system.
This Article recognizes that such a broad investigation would be well
beyond the current jurisdiction of a WTO panel. In contemplating such a
process, however, a number of factors should be kept in mind. First, while the
WTO admittedly lacks the competence to decide political questions, some
have argued that it does have the power to address the trade-related effects
that may emanate from a political decision.426 Second, such an investigation
would not be designed to prohibit a nation from exercising the security
exception, but would instead be designed to ensure that such an exception was
in fact based upon a security concern. Nations should be required to adhere to
the provisions of the 1982 Ministerial Declaration and abstain from taking
restrictive trade measures "for reasons of a non-economic character." 427 Third,
a finding that a measure was in fact inconsistent with the terms of article XXI
426. See, e.g., GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 7, 1982, GATT Doc. CM1157,
at 13 (June 22, 1982).
427. Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 29, 1982, GAIT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 9, 11 (1983).
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would not necessarily mean that such a measure would be precluded by the
GATT. The action, while an invalid exercise of the security exception, could
still be pursued under a more appropriate article of the agreement and subject
to the due process procedures contained in any such article.
If the performance of such an analysis leads to the conclusion that a
measure is not a bonafide exercise of the security exception, be it in terms of
motivation, necessity, or effect, the panel would be entitled to find that a
violation of the GATT has occurred, that a primafacie case of nullification or
impairment has been established, and that a withdrawal of the measure should
be recommended. If one believes that more credence should be given to a
sovereign's security-based activity, an alternate process could be employed.
Under such an alternative, a panel would be denied the authority to
recommend the withdrawal of the measure, but it would be allowed to find a
primafacie nullification or impairment, thereby shifting the burden of proof to
the invoking nation. In the absence of a sufficient rebuttal, the panel could
recommend the waiver remedy discussed below.
On the other hand, if a measure were found to be a bonafide exercise of
the security exception, a panel could still be entitled to address the question of
nullification or impairment in a non-violation proceeding. Such an argument
would be supported by the fact that this issue was specifically left unanswered
in the Nicaragua case.4 2 8 In such a non-violation proceeding, the complaining
party would have the burden of proof regarding such elements as reasonable
expectations and the existence of injury. If a nullification or impairment of
benefits was established, however, the panel would not be entitled to require a
withdrawal. This Article suggests, however, that the Panel should be
permitted to recommend a general waiver.
The remedies currently available under article XXIII have proven
ineffective when severe security-based measures have been involved. The
obvious political tensions that give rise to the imposition of the measures tend
to make "sympathetic consideration" and "satisfactory adjustment" extremely
difficult.429 Nevertheless, article XXIII was arguably designed not merely to
authorize reprisal or the withdrawal of concessions, but to maintain and
restore the "balance of interests" among the parties. 430 As the Nicaraguan
delegation argued, one of the basic benefits of the GATT was a party's right
to a satisfactory adjustment when the balance of rights and duties had been
affected. Merely authorizing the suspension of concessions would be neither
satisfactory nor a restoration of the balance of interests argued for above. In
the delegation's opinion, the Contracting Parties were fully entitled to
recommend any action, consistent with international law and the basic
objectives of the agreement, that would mitigate the effects of the embargo. 431
428. Unpublished Panel Report on United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, 1986
WL 363154, L/6053, 5.11 (Oct. 13, 1986) (unadopted). See supra note 416.
429. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIH, para. 1.
430. Unpublished Panel Report on United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, 1986
WL 363154, L/6053, 4.14 (Oct. 13, 1986) (unadopted).
431. Id. Professor Jackson has indicated that the language of article XXIII "is broad and
sweeping. The language itself is not limited just to 'compensating' redress but is broad enough to be
used as the basis for serious sanctions. For instance, all concessions of all other contracting parties could
be suspended vis-a-vis a notoriously offending contracting party-in effect, driving it out of GATT-if
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In the spirit of providing such satisfactory solutions, this Article suggests
that WTO panels should play a greater role in the WTO waiver process. Under
current practice, the granting of waivers falls within the jurisdiction of the
Contracting Parties. Article XXV, paragraph 5 of the GATT provides that in
exceptional circumstances, the Contracting Parties "may waive an obligation
imposed upon a contracting party by this Agreement; Provided that any such
decision shall be approved by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast., 432
While accompanied by a variety of procedural mechanisms, such as
consultation, the granting of notice, and the use of a working party to examine
the waiver request, article XXV, paragraph 5 is extremely broad in scope.433 It
allows the Contracting Parties to waive any and all obligations undertaken by
members, including those concerning non-discrimination, and it "places no
limitations on the exercise of that right.,
434
In the Nicaragua case, the Nicaraguan delegation, in searching for a
more meaningful remedy, requested that the panel recommend to the
Contracting Parties that they grant a general waiver of article I, in accordance
with article XXV, paragraph 5. Such a waiver would permit nations to choose
to give differential and more favorable treatment to Nicaraguan products in
order to alleviate the effects of the embargo and to restore the balance of
rights under the Agreement.435 The United States responded by indicating that
it would be beyond the competence of a panel to recommend any action be
taken by third contracting parties who were neither party to, nor represented
in, the dispute.
436
In considering whether it would be appropriate for a panel established
under article XXIII to make such a recommendation, the Nicaragua Panel
noted that the GATT practices and procedures surrounding waivers were
designed to ensure that a waiver would not be granted without first
considering the views of the parties that would be directly affected by the
waiver.4 37 It concluded that the Panel would be acting contrary to such
practice and procedure if it were to recommend a change in the obligations of
third parties that had no part in the Panel's proceedings and whose views it
could therefore not consider.
438
the Contracting Parties determined this to be 'appropriate.' Likewise, lesser penalties, but still stronger
than compensating redress, could be authorized for application by groups of contracting parties."
JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 3, at 186-87.
432. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXV, para. 5. This article states that:
In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this Agreement, the Contracting
Parties may waive an obligation imposed upon a contracting party by this Agreement; Provided
that any such decision shall be approved by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast and that such
majority shall comprise more than half of the contracting parties. The Contracting Parties may
also by such a vote (i) define certain categories of exceptional circumstances to which other
voting requirements shall apply for the waiver of obligations, and (ii) prescribe such criteria as
may be necessary for the application of this paragraph.
433. GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 10, at 883-85.
434. Id. at 882 citing the Report of the Working Party in 1952 on The European Coal and Steel
Community.
435. Unpublished Panel Report on United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, 1986





YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
However, the panel did go on to emphasize the fact that Nicaragua had
the right to submit a request for a waiver directly to the Contracting Parties. In
an apparent attempt to encourage Nicaragua to do so, the panel indicated that
its decision not to recommend the waiver was based solely on procedural
grounds and should in no way be interpreted as prejudging a decision by the
Contracting Parties.4 39 The Panel recalled that the consequences of the
embargo had been severe and had "seriously upset" competitive
relationships. 440
Despite current practice, this Article proposes that a WTO panel, at least
under certain prescribed circumstances, should be made part of the waiver
decision-making process. The panel should be entitled to recommend a
general or blanket waiver under article XXV, paragraph 5 when (i) an article
XXIII complaint challenges the imposition of a security-based measure; (ii)
applying the broad considerations suggested throughout this Article, the panel
finds that the measure imposed was not a bona fide exercise of the security
exception or that it resulted in a non-violation nullification or impairment; (iii)
the party instituting the complaint is in fact a developing country, or as a
surrogate measure, has a disproportionally small Gross National Product when
compared to that of the invoker; and (iv) the panel finds that in the absence of
a waiver no other meaningful remedy would be available. This waiver would
allow other contracting parties, at their option, to give preferential treatment to
the goods and services of the target in order to counterbalance the effects of
the sanction.
Several observations may be made in support of such a proposal. First,
the absence of any other meaningful remedy should be accepted as a sufficient
basis for satisfying the "exceptional circumstances" prerequisite of article
XXV:5. Without such an interpretation, the protection afforded by article
XXIII would become a nullity for less-developed contracting parties.
Additionally, the filing of a blanket waiver request by the target nation should
be viewed as a procedural substitute for individual filings by third party
nations potentially interested in granting a preference. Second, it should be
emphasized that a waiver would only allow, not require, the granting of
preferential treatment. Third, the authority to issue such a recommendation
may actually serve to deter questionable security-based activity. As both a
reflection of international public opinion and as a mechanism for facilitating
the waiver process, a recommendation or the threat thereof may discourage
nations from erring on the side of imposition. Fourth, since the use of such a
recommendation would be designed to protect the interests of less-developed
countries lacking the power of retaliation, its use would reflect not only the
spirit of Part IV of the GATT,441 but also the sentiments expressed in the
Enabling Clause.442 Since the Enabling Clause already permits contracting
parties to "accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. See supra notes 205-214 and accompanying text.
442. Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203 (1980).
[Vol. 26: 413
Creating Standards
countries, without according such treatment to other contracting parties," 443 it
can be argued that the use of the recommendations being proposed would be
consistent with the basic objectives of the GATT. Fifth, by examining the
broad considerations presented in this Article, and by making a
recommendation based upon such an analysis, a panel would provide a
substantial body of evidence for the Contracting Parties to consider. The
panel's findings could actually facilitate the waiver process by replacing the
working party review system.
One might argue that a panel should not make recommendations
regarding contracting parties who did not take part in the proceedings and
whose views were therefore not considered. To address this problem, this
Article suggests that article XXIII complaints challenging security-based
measures be reviewed in two phases. During the first phase of the
proceedings, the panel would address the issues of whether the measure was a
bona fide exercise of the security exception and (irrespective of such a
finding) whether benefits accruing to the complaining party have been
nullified or impaired. During the second or remedy phase of the hearing, the
panel could invite all potentially affected parties to join the proceedings for
the purpose of expressing their views. Such a process would in fact reflect the
basic objectives found in article 10 of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.444 This article provides that
not only will the interests of the actual parties to a dispute "be fully taken into
account during the panel process," but that the interests of "those of other
Members under a covered agreement at issue in the dispute" will also be
4.45
considered. More particularly, it provides that "any Member having a
substantial interest in a matter before a panel.., shall have an opportunity to
be heard by the panel and to make written submissions." 446 A further degree
of participation is ensured by the fact that any party feeling adversely affected
by the anel's recommendation would have similar recourse to article
XXIII. 44?
The granting of preference to the products of a target nation, of course,
could adversely affect the competitive position of third countries that produce
and export similar products. As the demand for the target's products increase,
however, an equilibrium might eventually be reached that could reflect both
the lower or non-existent tariff and the upward pressure on price. As a safety
mechanism, however, it is beyond question that the existence of a waiver does
not preclude an affected party from seeking relief. While preferences would
be valid when extended in conformity with the terms of a waiver granted by
the Contracting Parties, the Understanding in Respect of Waivers clearly
provides that third parties whose benefits have been nullified or impaired as a
443. Id.
444. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 10,
supra note 17, at 362.
445. Id., art. 10, para. 1.
446. Id., art. 10, para. 2.
447. Id., art. 10, para. 4.
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result of the application of measures taken pursuant to a waiver, would be
entitled to seek relief under article XXIII.
448
Finally, in considering the blanket waiver remedy being proposed here,
the Contracting Parties will face a fundamental policy issue. If panels are
granted the authority to recommend waivers in the prescribed circumstances
outlined above, the mechanism for giving effect to those recommendations
must be addressed. The Contracting Parties could take the position that such a
recommendation will only be implemented if a two-thirds majority of the
votes cast by the Contracting Parties, pursuant to the procedures contained in
article XXV, paragraph 5, is forthcoming. Alternatively, waiver
recommendations contained in a panel report could be adopted pursuant to the
procedures outlined in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes.449 Under such circumstances, the waiver would be
adopted, along with the rest of the Panel Report, unless there was a consensus
not to adopt the Report.45°
In either event, the use of the waiver mechanism, at least in non-
violation cases, would represent an attempt to balance the rights of
sovereignty with a movement toward multilateralism. It would, in effect,
provide a multilateral remedy in security disputes while preserving the
individual decision-making power of the invoker. In a non-violation case, the
panel would be acknowledging a nation's sovereign right to impose a security
measure and could not require withdrawal or alteration of policy. At the same
time, the panel would be recognizing the rights of all other sovereign nations
to express, by means of granting preferences to the target, their agreement or
disagreement with the invoker's practices. Further, the existence of such
agreement or disagreement would tend to provoke interpretations of
international norms and thereby spur the process of internalization.
3. A Concluding Comment
In searching for accountability, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism
is not the only venue for the resolution of security-based issues. As discussed
earlier,451 a credible argument can be made that both the International Court of
Justice and the U.N. Security Council could exercise jurisdiction in this
regard. Nevertheless, a closer working relationship between the WTO and the
United Nations should be established. Article XXIII, for example, provides
that the Contracting Parties may consult with the Economic and Social
Council of the United Nations as well as with "any appropriate inter-
governmental organization" in any case where such consultation is deemed
necessary. 452 Another possibility for interaction between the United Nations
and the WTO can be found in the Havana Charter, which arguably envisions
448. Understanding in Respect of Waivers of Obligations Under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, LEGAL TEXTs, supra note 1, at 29.
449. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, supra note
17.
450. For discussion regarding the adoption of Panel Report and the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, see supra note 17.
451. See supra notes 357-380 and accompanying text.
452. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIII, para. 2.
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the possibility of seeking advisory opinions from the International Court of
Justice regarding the interpretation of GATT provisions.45 3 Additionally, the
United Nations could play a more substantial role in the approval or
disapproval of proposed unilateral security-based sanctions.454 Both invokers
and targets could be granted the option of divesting WTO panels of security-
related jurisdiction in favor of ICJ or U.N. Security Council proceedings.
Unfortunately, while international agreements tend to emphasize both
the need for cooperation and the principle of sovereign equality, the realities
of economic and political power do not reflect those ideals. The possession of
power allows a nation to pursue its self-interest more actively, as domestic
pressures tend to encourage a nation to do.
In a world that is substantially segregated in terms of wealth, power can
be a significant ally when used to improve global standards of living and the
observance of fundamental human rights. In order for a unilateral exercise of
power to be beneficial, however, the invoker's self-interest must correspond to
the economic, political, and cultural needs of other nations. Such a synthesis is
often lacking.
If less-developed nations are to have a voice within our international
institutions and if they are to have the opportunity to share in the increasing
pool of global wealth, our perceptions of self-interest must be tempered with a
broader allegiance to international law. Governments, as well as the people
they represent, must recognize that their future well-being is dependent upon a
reduction in the economic and political divisions among nations and that a
more multilateral approach to the resolution of global disputes is to be
embraced rather than feared.
453. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on June 29-30, 1982, GATr Doc. CM159, at
16 (Aug. 10, 1982).
454. See GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on Nov. 5, 1986, GATT Doc. C/M/204, at
12-13 (Nov. 19, 1986). In regard to increasing the interaction between the World Trade Organization
and the United Nations with reference to security issues, see Perez, supra note 10.
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